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TOWARDS A MADISONIAN, INTEREST-GROUP-BASED,
APPROACH TO LOBBYING REGULATION
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
ABSTRACT
Recent lobbying scandals involving Jack Abramoff and Representative
Tom DeLay have created a much-needed impetus for legislative reform of
the lobbying process. But the question cries out: Will Congress actually
enact any of the multitude of reform proposals currently on the table, and if
it does, will any of those reforms make a difference in how the lobbying
process operates? History suggests that the answer is "no."
This Article examines the reasons for Congress's persistent failure to
enact effective lobbying reform and posits that the primary cause is an underlying disjunct between legislators' and the public's views about the value
of lobbying. Before effective lobbying reform can be achieved, a fundamental shift in the philosophy underlying lobbying regulation must take place.
The basic problem with existing lobbying regulations-and with all of the
reforms currently under consideration by Congress-is that they focus on
disclosure by lobbyists alone, leaving the elected officials whom lobbyists
target, and the interest groups behind the lobbyists, essentially unregulated.
This Article advocates that lobbying regulations instead (1) should require
disclosures by elected officials about official-lobbyist contacts and (2)
should seek to capitalize on interest group competition for access to legislators as a method for disseminating lobbying disclosures to the voting public,
and for generating more evenhanded political contact between elected officials and interests on different sides of an issue.
In this manner, lobbying regulations both could produce more substantively informative disclosures and could increase the likelihood that the
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voting public pays attention to such disclosures, while also creating an incentive for elected officials to increase their own exposure to differing
viewpoints before rendering policy decisions. As a result, voter competence
at the ballot box, as well as the quality of legislative outcomes, should improve.
INTRODUCTION
Lobbying long has been a dirty word in the eyes of the American public. The images it conjures are many, from well-dressed insiders casually
peddling their clients' cases before elected officials over fancy four-course
meals, to brackish political hacks cornering members of Congress in House
and Senate lobbies, to hired guns offering campaign contributions and other
financial incentives in exchange for unspoken future allegiance from those
elected to public office. Public distrust of lobbying is as old as the profession itself, and efforts to regulate or reform the lobbying process, not coincidentally, have been a perennial agenda item in Congress.
In fact, in the twentieth century alone, lobbying reform has been the
subject of over fifteen congressional investigations and has resulted in at
least as many hearings and legislative markups.' Such congressional efforts
1.
See, e.g., Regulation of Lobbying, Hearings Before the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, H.R. Res. 1031, 91st Cong. (1970) (investigation driven by scandals involving, inter alia,
Lyndon Johnson aide Bobby Baker); The Federal Lobbying Disclosure Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d
Cong. (1991); PublicDisclosure of Lobbying Activity: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law & Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. (1979); Lobby Reform
Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong. (1975); Public
Disclosure of Lobbying Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) (explaining that there were thirty-five
bills introduced in the House regarding lobbying and disclosure in one year); Hearings Before the H.
Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., pts. 1-10 (1950) (general lobbying reform investigation); Registration and Regulation of Lobbyists: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 74th Cong. (1935) (investigations on lobbying improprieties generally); Investigation of
Lobbying Activities: Hearings Before a S. Special Comm. to Investigate Lobbying Activities, 74th Cong.,
pts. 1-10 (1935-1936) (investigation into lobbying activities of the utility industry); Alleged Activities at
the Geneva Conference: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 71st Cong.
(1930) (investigations into lobbyist efforts to sink the Geneva Naval Limitation Conference); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 99TH CONG., CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: LOBBYING IN A MODERN
DEMOCRACY 47 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS] (hearings instituted by Senator Case after receiving bribe offer for his vote on natural gas bill); S. REP. No. 85-395
(1957) (special committee investigation of alleged lobbying improprieties involving the Natural Gas Act,
the Federal Highway Act, and sugar legislation); H.R. REP. NO. 81-3239 (1951) (report and recommendations on Federal Lobbying Act); H.R. REP. NO. 81-3238 (1951) (investigation into expenditures by
farm and labor organizations to influence legislation); H.R. REP. No. 81-3137 (1950) (investigation into
expenditures by corporation to influence legislation); H.R. REP. NO. 74-2214 (1936) (drafted in response
to investigation of public utilities lobbying); S. REP. NO. 71-43 (1929) (investigation into lobbying
improprieties involving Manufacturers Association of Connecticut); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Federal
Lobbying Regulation: History Through 1954, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS 5, 7-8 (William V. Luneburg & Thomas M.
Susman eds., 3d ed. 2005) (discussing HearingsBefore the Select Comm. of the H.R. Appointed Under
H.R. 198, 63d Cong. (1913), an investigation of alleged unscrupulous lobbying by the National Association of Manufacturers and H.R. 15,466, 63d Cong. (1914), the bill introduced after that investigation;
and Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciaryon S. Res. 92, A Resolution Instruct-
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typically have followed on the heels of highly publicized lobbying scandals.
Recent efforts to reform the lobbying process, including the Special Interest
Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005 (SILEAA), 2 sponsored by
Representatives Meehan and Emmanuel, the Lobbying Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2005 (LTAA), 3 sponsored by Senator McCain, and
the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act of 2007 (LTAAII) 4,
which adds a number of internal Senate Rules changes to the text of the
2005 LTAA, are no exception-predictably having followed in the wake of
well-publicized scandals involving lobbyist Jack Abramoff5 and Representative Tom DeLay. 6 But if past experience is any indication, lobbying reforms enacted as a result of these scandals-if, indeed, any reforms are enacted at all-are unlikely to effect substantial change in the way that lobbying is practiced.
This Article examines the reasons for Congress's persistent failure to
enact effective lobbying reform and argues that a fundamental shift in the
philosophy underlying lobbying regulation is in order. For the past decade,
lobbying has been regulated under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 19957
(LDA) and related House and Senate rules restricting gift-giving by lobbyists to members of Congress. 8 All pending proposals to reform the lobbying
process, including the SILEAA and the two LTAAs, are styled as amendments to the LDA, ostensibly designed to expand the reach 9 and efficacy of
ing the Comm. on the Judiciary to Investigate the Charge That a Lobby Is Maintained to Influence
Legislation Pending in the Senate, 63d Cong. (1913), a special investigation of tariff lobbying).
2.
See H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. (2005).
3.
See S. 2128, 109th Cong. (2005) (as reported by Senate, Mar. 3, 2006); see also Lobbying and
Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong.; Stealth Lobbyist Disclosure Act of 2005, H.R. 1302
and H.R. 1304, 109th Cong.; Lobby Gift Ban Act of 2005, H.R. 3177, 109th Cong.; Terrorist Lobby
Disclosure Act of 2005, S. 1972, 109th Cong.; H.R. 3623, 109th Cong. (2005) (a bill "to increase to 5
years the period during which former Members of Congress may not engage in certain lobbying activities"); H.R. Res. 81, 109th Cong. (2005) (requiring "the Clerk of the House of Representatives to post on
the official [House website] all lobbying registrations and reports filed with the Clerk under the
[LDA]").
4.
See S. 1, 110th Cong. (2007).
5.
See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Abramoff Conviction Gives New Impetus to Moves in Congress to Toughen
Curbs on Lobbying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at A18; Neil A. Lewis, Official Tipped Abramoff on
Client's Case, Filing Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 20.
6.
See, e.g., Marie Cocco, DeLay's Worst: A Dirty Drama of Bondage, NEWSDAY, May 10, 2005,
at A34 (describing public outrage over reports that lobbyists paid for a Scottish golf junket taken by
DeLay, his wife, and aides); Anne E. Komblut & Glen Justice, Inquiry Focusing on Second Firm with
Connections to DeLay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 1.
7.
S. Res. 1060, 104th Cong., 109 Stat. 691 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (2000) and
other scattered sections).
8.
See S. Res. 158, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. Res. 250, 104th Cong. (1995). The bans were
adopted separately by each chamber in the form of resolutions and, inter alia, limit the value of gifts
(e.g., meals and entertainment ) that members of Congress may accept from lobbyists (no individual gift
to a senator may exceed $50 in value and no more than $100 in cumulative gifts may given by any one
source) as well as prohibit representatives from accepting free travel to substantially recreational events
such as charity trips where congressmen and lobbyists golf and ski together to raise money for charities.
See S. Res. 158, § l(a)(2); H.R. Res. 250, § 2(a)(2).
9.
For example, Title I of the 2007 LTAA would add to Senate Standing Rules a requirement that
all committee and conference reports include a list disclosing any proposed earmarks, their Senate sponsor, and their avowed purpose-and that such disclosures be made publicly available on the Internet at
least forty-eight hours prior to Senate consideration of the relevant bill or resolution. See S. 1, §§ 103-
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disclosure,' ° revolving door," and gift reporting 2 requirements already imposed by the Act, and by House and Senate gift rules. Not surprisingly,
given their common starting point, existing lobbying regulations and most
of the proposed reforms13suffer from the same flaw: They are classic cases of
"symbolic legislation," designed to appease the public superficially without effecting any real change in how elected officials conduct business with
lobbyists or the interest groups whom lobbyists represent. Moreover, the
LDA, internal rules, and pending reform proposals all make lobbyistsrather than the legislators whom they target or the interest groups whom
they represent-the focal point of lobbying regulation. Worse, they cast
14
Congress as a victim, or at least a passive actor, in the lobbying process
and essentially ignore the public's underlying concerns about the influence
that lobbyists exercise over legislators.
I argue that the key to effective lobbying reform is to abandon this misguided approach to lobbying regulation, which focuses on lobbyists as the
main actors and views disclosures about who hires lobbyists as magical
cure-alls that somehow "will increase public confidence in the integrity of
Government."1 5 If lobbying reform is to be meaningful, it should regulate
not only lobbyists but also those actors with whom the public is most concerned-the elected officials whom lobbyists seek to influence. Further, if
lobbying reform is to be both meaningful and successful, it should take into
account a third, currently overlooked, set of actors in the lobbying process-the interest groups who hire lobbyists to represent their positions. In
other words, lobbying reform should become less concerned with disclosure
for the sake of disclosure and more concerned with the dynamics created by
disclosure-how disclosures will be used and whom they can benefit in the
legislative process.
Thus far, the conventional wisdom behind congressional lobbying regulation has been that requiring lobbyists to disclose their clients' names and
104, 110th Cong. (2007).
10.
Title I of the LTAAs, labeled "Enhancing Lobbying Disclosure," would amend the LDA to
provide for, inter alia, quarterly filings of lobbying disclosure reports, electronic filing of such reports,
creation of a public database for accessing such reports, application of the LDA's disclosure requirements to grassroots lobbying, and increased penalties for violations of the LDA's disclosure requirements. See S. 1, 110th Cong. §§ 211, 214, 216, 219 (2007); S. 2128, 109th Cong. §§ 101-103, 105, 107
(2005). SILEAA provides for these same expansions, in virtually identical language. See H.R. 2412,
109th Cong. §§ 101-103, 106,402 (2005).
11. See S. 1, §§ 110-113 (prohibiting former officeholders from lobbying for one year after leaving
office, prohibiting spouses of officeholders from lobbying and requiring disclosure of employment
negotiations between officeholders and lobbying firms); S. 2128, §§ 201-203 ("Title l!--Slowing the
Revolving Door"); H.R. 2412, §§ 201-03 ("Title 11--Slowing the Revolving Door").
12.
See S. 1, § 109 (restrictions on lobbyist participation in travel and disclosure); S.2128, §§ 301304 ("Title IV-Ban on Provision of Gifts or Travel by Lobbyists in Violation of the Rules of Congress"); H.R. 2412, §§ 301-304 ("Tide Ill--Curbing Excesses In Privately Funded Travel") (providing
travel and gift restrictions only slightly different from those in the Senate bill).
13.
For detailed discussions of symbolic legislation, see MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES
OF POLITICS (1964); and John P. Dwyer, The Pathologyof Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233

(1990).
14.
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
15.
2 U.S.C. § 1601(3) (2000).
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lobbying expenditures will cause the clients (i.e., interest groups) and lobbyists to behave in a more open and honest manner. But the more likely real
world consequence of disclosure requirements is that they will enable those
actors with the greatest capacity to capitalize on information in the lobbying
game-interest groups-better to police each other's activities, contacts,
and expenditures on a given issue. Although the public may not realize it,
this is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, greater transparency and increased monitoring across interest groups could lead to more balanced political participation by interests on both sides of an issue, as opposing
groups seek to match or "check" each other's efforts in true Madisonian
fashion. 16 Thus, the key to more effective lobbying regulation may be to
embrace the fact that interest groups are the entities with the greatest incentive to take advantage of lobbying disclosures and, accordingly, to structure
lobbying regulations in a manner that encourages organized interests, in
maximizing their own positions, also to further public goals.
Part I of this Article highlights the symbolic nature of the LDA, illustrating that the statute was designed to enable legislators publicly to claim
credit for imposing restrictions on the lobbying process while in practice
permitting lobbyists to conduct business as usual. Part I also explores how
the 1995 LDA fails the public, positing that there is a disjunct between public versus congressional perceptions of the role played by lobbyists in the
legislative process. Part II discusses the goals that a public-regarding, rather
than symbolic, approach to lobbying regulation should seek to achieveincluding improved voter competence and more informed legislating. Part
III argues that the key to accomplishing such public-regarding reform is to
focus not on lobbyists, as Congress has done for the past two centuries, but
on the two entities between which lobbyists mediate: elected officials and
interest groups. First, the Act's disclosure requirements should be expanded
to require information from elected officials, in both the legislative and executive branches, as well as from lobbyists. Second, lobbying reforms
should be designed to take advantage of interest groups' natural incentives
to use disclosed information to increase their access to elected officials and
to make disclosed information accessible to the public. Part El ends with a
policy proposal outlining specific lobbying reforms dictated by an interestgroup-based approach to lobbying regulation and comparing and contrasting
these suggested reforms with the pending proposals introduced in the 109th
and 110th Congresses. Part IV discusses the political conditions that must
exist in order for Congress to enact the suggested reforms and possible
strategies for creating such conditions.

16.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894); see also discussion
infra Part M.A.
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I. THE LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1995: SYMBOLIC REFORM

A. How and Why the LDA Is a "Symbolic" Statute
Unlike most lobbying reform efforts, 7 the LDA was not drafted in response to any particular lobbying scandal. Rather, it represented the effectuation of a series of campaign promises-by Ross Perot and Bill Clinton in
1992 and by Republican congressional candidates in 1994-to change the
way that lobbying was practiced in Washington and to curb the influence
wielded by special interests in the lawmaking process.18 Thus, the Act's
preamble emphasizes the public's right to be informed about behind-thescenes activities that impact the formation of public policy. Specifically, the
preamble lists three congressional findings that form the basis for the Act's
provisions: (1) that "responsible representative Government requires public
awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process.., of the Federal Government;" (2) that "existing lobbying
disclosure statutes have been ineffective because of unclear statutory language [and] weak administrative and enforcement provisions;" and (3) that
"effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid
lobbyists to influence Federal officials [would] increase public confidence
in the integrity of Government."' 9 The disclosure provisions that follow the
preamble, however, borrow wholesale from lobbying reform bills drafted in
prior years. As a result, the LDA, like all previous congressional lobbying
proposals, 20 focuses almost exclusively on regulating lobbyists-rather than
17.

See, e.g., H.R. 2412; S.2128.

18.
See, e.g., NANCY WATZMAN, INDECENT DISCLOSURE: How EXISTING LOBBYING LAW LETS
LOBBYISTS GET AWAY WITHOUT DISCLOSING BASIC INFORMATION: AN'EXAMINATION OF THREE

MAJOR LOBBYING CAMPAIGNS (Public Citizen's Congress Watch, 1993), reprinted in Reform of Laws
Governing Lobbying: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary,104th Cong. 89 (1995) (attachment to statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen)
(noting that the "theme" of 1992 elections was public disgust over "'business as usual' in Washington"
and that "voters responded eagerly when candidates such as Ross Perot decried special interest influence"; commenting that President Clinton drew continued attention to "special interest lobbying [after
taking office], calling for reform of... disclosure laws in his State of the Union address"); Bill Targets
Lobbying Law Loopholes, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3477, 3477 (1995) (noting that many members of
the Republican freshman class "were elected on pledges to change the way Congress operates"); Jonathan D. Salant, Members Urge Action on Lobbying Issue, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2857, 2857 (1995)
(reporting that the LDA was being pushed through in part by Republican freshmen seeking to live up to
their campaign pledges); Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Says Lobby-Reform Bill Will 'Pull Back The Curtains'; Measure Reflects Bipartisan Consensus, Has Major Curbs, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1995, at A8
(noting that Clinton called for lobbying reform in his State of the Union Address and that "[1]obby reform also was a plank in the House Republicans' 'Contract with America"').
19.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
20.
See, e.g., Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 839 (1946) (previously codified
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-270) (requiring disclosures, by lobbyists, of contacts with members of Congress),
repealed by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, § 11(a), 109 Stat. 691; Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, ch. 327, § 1, 52 Stat. 631 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611621 (2000)) (provision requiring all persons who are agents of foreign principals to file informational
statements with the State Department); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 101, 49 Stat. 1985
(codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1101-1295 (2000)) (provision requiring registration by those who presented, advocated, or opposed matters within the scope of the Merchant Marine Act and related shipping
legislation before Congress, the Federal Maritime Board, or the Secretary of Commerce); Eskridge,
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the federal officials whom they contact-and operates on the fundamental
premise that simple disclosure of the names of lobbyists' clients, issue areas, and the amounts expended on lobbying will revolutionize the way that
lobbying is practiced. The result is symbolic legislation 21 that promises
sweeping change but delivers lobbying as usual.
For, beyond elected officials' surface rhetoric,2 2 the LDA discernibly is
more concerned with appearances than with substantive reform. The statute
nowhere even purports to require or promote any change in how lobbyists
behave; in fact, the Act's preamble makes clear that it seeks only to ensure
that all lobbyists make publicly available information about their clients,
funding, and the issue areas with respect to which they lobby.23 Likewise,
Congress, in enacting the LDA, made no claims that its regulations would
require lobbyists to alter their business practices. Rather, the congressional
pitch was that if the LDA forced lobbyists to disclose to the public their
clients' names, lobbying expenditures, and issue areas of concern, then the
principles of representative government would be served and "public confidence in the integrity of Government" (automatically) would increase. 24 In
supra note 1, at 8 (discussing S. 1095, 70th Cong. (1928), a lobbyist registration and reporting measure
contemplated in the wake of a lobbying scandal involving opponents of a federal estate tax bill, and H.R.
15,466, 63d Cong. (1914), a bill introduced in response to 1913 lobbying scandal involving the National
Association of Manufacturers).
21.
Scholars have coined the term "symbolic legislation" to describe a law whose primary purpose
is to appease public demand for action while in practice effecting little of what it promises. See, e.g.,
EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 22-29; Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 733-34 (2005). As Elizabeth Garrett has explained, symbolic legislation
is "an attempt to defuse an issue that has roused a normally quiescent and inattentive public while leaving the underlying process of lawmaking, bargaining, and interest group interaction largely unchanged."
Id.
22.
Congress, for example, widely touted the LDA, and the gift ban resolutions that followed, as
breakthroughs in lobbying regulation that would "chang[e] the political culture in Washington." Jonathan D. Salant & Richard Sammon, Senate Bans Lavish Gifts From Interest Groups, 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2237, 2237 (1995) (quoting Senator Paul Wellstone's comments about the gift ban) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 141 CONG. REC. S10,845, S10,857 (daily ed. July 28, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatfield) (commenting that LDA and Senate gift rule reforms "take significant steps"
to improve the lobbying process); 140 CONG. REC. H10,283, H10,285 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Cantwell) (commenting that the 1993 bill upon which the 1995 LDA was based "includes
the broadcast [sic] and strictest lobbying disclosure requirements ever enacted" and "permanently limits
the influence of lobbyists and special interests on Capitol Hill"); Lobbying Disclosure Act, 140 CONG.
REC. H1966, H1987 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (comments to same effect by Rep. Hoyer); Salant &
Sammon, supra, at 2237 (quoting Sen. William Cohen's remarks that "[t]here has been a major step
forward [and] [olverall, we can claim we moved the institution toward reform" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). President Clinton similarly promised that the LDA would help "give ordinary Americans a
greater stake in our government" by "pull[ing] back the curtains from the world of Washington lobbying" and ensuring that "the days of secret lobbying are over." President William J. Clinton, Remarks By
the President at Signing Ceremony for the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Dec. 19, 1995), available
at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/121995-speech-by-president-at-lobbying-reform-billsigning.htm.
23.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1601(3) (2000).
24.
Id.; see also Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the
Constitutionof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 7 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing:Lobbying
Disclosure Reform Proposals], available at 1995 WL 527076 (statement of Sen. Levin) ("Lobbying
disclosure will enhance public confidence in government by ensuring that the public is aware of the
efforts that are made by paid lobbyists to influence public policy."); Phil Kuntz, New Lobbying Reform
Bill Has Watchdogs' OK; Passage Predicted,But Groups Agree It Still Leaves Some Loopholes, S.F.
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other words, Congress designed the LDA not to repair improprieties in the
lobbying system but to shed light on that system, in the hope that educating
the public about how the lobbying process operates would "erase the appearanceof impropriety" popularly associated with lobbyists' activities.25
There also was some suggestion by those drafting the LDA that the
Act's disclosure requirements might lead to better lobbying practices on the
part of lobbyists and their clients by revealing links between lobbying expenditures and success in the legislative process.26 But the suggestion was
little more than rhetoric given that the LDA does not require disclosures
about specific issues, proposals, votes, or pieces of legislation that a lobbyist is hired to influence, nor does it require lobbyists to name the specific
officials they contact 27 or to reveal the success or failure of their activities
on behalf of particular clients.28 Thus, even if Lobbyist X were to disclose
that he lobbied the House of Representatives on behalf of Client A regarding Issue Q, and even if a watchful public citizen knew that the House reported out a bill dealing with Issue Q, it would be difficult for the citizen to
gauge Lobbyist X's success without knowing Client A's preferences concerning specific components of Issue Q and how those preferences were
reflected in, or rejected by, the bill passed by the House.2 9
Further, the disclosures required by the Act are minimal and are made
in a format that is neither easily accessible nor decipherable by average citizens. Currently, lobbyists comply with the Act by filling out forms created
by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate and return these
forms to the Clerk's and Secretary's offices, where the forms are reviewed
EXAMINER, Jan. 30, 1994, at A4 (noting, with respect to 1993 bill on which the LDA is based, that
"[s]upporters envision a sunshine-filled world of computerized and cross-indexed data that will illuminate how power is leveraged in Washington-thus producing a better-informed public and a more perfect
democracy"). For further discussion, see supra Part I.A and specifically note 16 and accompanying text.
25.
Reform of Laws Governing Lobbying: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 2 (1995) (statement of Rep. Charles T. Canady, Chairman,
Subcomm. on the Constitution) (expressing hope that through the LDA Congress "can work to bring the
relationship between lobbyists and government officials into the ight and erase the appearance of impropriety from their dealings") (emphasis added).
26.
See, e.g., Hearing: Lobbying Disclosure Reform Proposals, supra note 24, at 7 (statement of
Sen. Levin) ("In some cases, such disclosure will perhaps encourage lobbyists and their clients to be
sensitive to even the appearance of improper influence.").
27.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (listing information that lobbyists are required to include in their registration reports).
28.
See id. § 1603(b)(5)(A)-(B) (requiring lobbyists to identify the "general issue areas" regarding
which they expect to lobby for the named client and leaving it in lobbyists' discretion to disclose "to the
extent practicable" specific issue "areas"--not specific bill provisions, preferences, or stances--on
which they already have lobbied).
29.
A lobbying client's preferences on an issue usually are more complicated and multifaceted than
a simple "yes" or "no" position on a bill, and lobbyist "success" on a particular issue is rarely complete.
See Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis, Introduction to Diana M. Evans, Lobbying the Committee:
Interest Groups and the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, in INrEREST GROUP
POLITICS 257, 257 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 3d ed. 1991). Most members of the public
do not have access to lobbying clients' preference breakdowns and, in any event, are not willing to do
the research necessary to piece together various pieces of disclosed information; thus, it is highly
unlikely that the disclosure requirements imposed by the LDA would frighten lobbyists or their clients
into changing their lobbying practices in any substantial manner. See id. at 258.
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and then made available to the public-in hard copy at the Legislative Resource Center and at the Senate Office of Public Records in Washington,
D.C. and, to a more limited extent, online through the Senate's official website.3 ° In keeping with the Act's requirements,3' the form consists primarily
of lines asking lobbying firms to list the name, address, and principal place
of business of (1) the registering lobbying firm; (2) the client on whose behalf the firm has or will engage in lobbying; (3) any affiliated organization
that has contributed more than $10,000 towards the registering firm's lobbying activities; and (4) any foreign entities that hold at least 20% ownership
in the client or any of its affiliated organizations.3 2 A very small section asks
lobbyists to list a three-letter code describing their "[gleneral lobbying issue
areas" and then to describe their "[s]pecific lobbying issues (current and
anticipated). 33 Such disclosures cannot go very far towards enlightening
the public. For although the names of lobbying firms, individual lobbyists,
and even clients may have currency for members of Congress who deal with
these entities on a regular basis, they are of little use or relevance to average
members of the public.
Perhaps most revealing of its symbolic nature, the LDA requires lobbyists to reveal little information about the governmental officials whom they
contact. In fact, lobbyists need only state generally that they contacted the
House of Representatives or the Senate or a particular federal agency, such
as the Department of Energy at large, rather than specify individual legislators, committees, or federal employees with whom they corresponded. 34 It is
difficult to see how the American public is to derive from such vague, general disclosures a better understanding of the manner in which the lobbying
process operates, let alone gain renewed faith in its elected officials or in the
integrity of its government.
Finally, the LDA's status as a primarily symbolic law is evident from its
weak enforcement provisions. The sole penalty for violation of the Act's
registration provisions is a judicially imposed civil fine of up to $50,000.35
For lobbying firms that earn hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars in
revenues each year,36 this is barely a slap on the wrist. Further, only the
30.
See Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, Lobbying Disclosure,
http://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007); United States Senate Office
of Public Records, Lobby Filing Disclosure Program, http://sopr.senate.gov/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
31.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1603.
32.
See Clerk of the House of Representatives and Secretary of the Senate, Lobbying Registration,
Form LD-l, http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/ld-198.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Form LD-I]; see, e.g., United States Lobby Report Images, 2005 Mid-Year Termination Lobbying Report of Paul Marcone & Assocs., L.L.C., on behalf of client Mercyhurst College (May 2005),
available at http://sopr.senate. gov/cgi-winloprgifviewer.exe?/2005/01/000/212/00021219012.
33.
See Form LD-l, supra note 32, at 2.
34.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(2)(B).
35.
See id. § 1606. Section 12(b) of the LDA, which amended 18 U.S.C. § 219(a) (2000) to make it
illegal for public officials to act as lobbyists in connection with the representation of a foreign entity, is
the only part of the LDA that creates any criminal sanctions. See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691; see also 18 U.S.C. § 219(a).
36.
See, e.g., Andy Metzger & Anna Palmer, In '04 Returns, A Landslidefor Lobbyists, BROWARD
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United States District Attorney for the District of Columbia has authority to
prosecute violations of the Act, 37 and the Act leaves unclear how that office
is to gain evidence of such violations.
B. Behind the Symbolism: Why CurrentLobbying Regulations
Failthe Public
Perhaps more important than understanding that there is a disconnect
between what the LDA promises and what it delivers is understanding why
that disconnect exists. Subpart 1 of this section analyzes the public's concerns about lobbying and special interests, arguing that the public cares
primarily about lobbyists' (and their clients') ability, both through money
and through insider access, to exert undue influence over elected officials.
Yet the LDA paradoxically ignores the role of elected officials in the lobbying process and pays almost no attention to the importance of lobbyist access, as distinct from monetary contributions, to elected officials. Subpart 2
examines why Congress responded to the public's concerns with the symbolic LDA. In addition to being externally constrained by the First Amendment, I argue that Congress structured the LDA as it did because Congress
(1) believes that the public misunderstands and is unduly critical of lobbyists' role in the legislative process, (2) wishes to continue its existing financial and informational relationships with lobbyists, and (3) prefers to avoid
subjecting itself to the burden of complying with lobbying disclosure regulations.
1. The Public's Concerns About Lobbying
The public perceives two main categories of problems with the lobbying
process: quid pro quos and unequal access. First, the public fears that
through campaign contributions, personal gifts, and perhaps even outright
bribery, lobbyists make elected officials beholden to them. 38 As a result, the
public believes, lobbyists are able to exert undue influence on the policymaking process by pressuring elected officials to vote in their clients' interests under threat of losing lobbyists' financial support.39 Such beliefs are
DAILY BUS. REV. (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 24, 2005, at 9 (reporting that top 50 Washington lobbying firms earned more than $840 million in fees in 2004 and cataloguing individual firms' revenues as
follows: "Patton Boggs ($65.8 million.. .), Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld ($64.2 million), Hogan &
Hartson ($51.6 million) ... DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary ($42.4 million)[,]" and Preston Gates Ellis
& Rouvelas Meeds ($21.4 million)).
See 2 U.S.C. § 1605(8) ('The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representa37.
tives shall. . . notify the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that a lobbyist or lobbying
firm may be in noncompliance with this chapter.").
See, e.g., Lobby Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 94th
38.
Cong. 18 (1975) (joint statement of Sen. Stafford and Sen. Kennedy) (describing widespread public
"view that government itself is the puppet of wealthy citizens and powerful interest groups"), quoted in
CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 1, at 59.
Common Cause representative Fred Wertheimer's comments before Congress are illustrative:
39.
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fueled by scandals, including Senator Francis Case's revelation in 1956 that
he was offered a $2,500 campaign contribution to influence his vote on a
pending natural gas bill 4° and President Clinton's 2001 pardon of fugitive
commodities trader Marc Rich amidst disclosures that Rich's wife, who
lobbied for the pardon, had contributed heavily to Clinton's library foundation. 4 1 For the most part, Congress has sought to address these types of quid
pro quo concerns through laws other than the LDA. For example, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197142 (FECA) and its successor, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200243 (BCRA), seek both to prevent the
actual purchasing of elected officials by special interests and to dispel the
appearance that elected officials can be purchased by setting limits on campaign contributions and requiring that such contributions be disclosed. 44 In
addition, a federal anti-bribery statute outlaws the giving and receiving of
quid pro quos in general, 45 and the House and Senate gift ban resolutions
implemented in 1995 aim to eliminate the appearance of undue influence by
prohibiting lobbyists from wining and dining elected officials. 46 The LDA
itself addresses the public's concerns about quid pro quo corruption only
minimally, through the requirement that lobbyists disclose the amounts that
their clients have paid for their lobbying activities.47

The single most important factor... in undermining public confidence in the integrity of
Congress and its ability to make decisions on the merits, is the role being played by PAC contributions ... PACs are generally tied to groups that regularly conduct organized lobbying efforts, and campaign contributions are an integral part of these efforts ....
PACs, through
campaign contributions, are creating a higher obligation for our representatives, an obligation
to serve PAC interests, first and foremost.
CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 1, at 22.
40.
See id. at 47.
41.
Denise Rich reportedly gave at least $450,000 to President Clinton's library foundation. See
Marc Lacey, Resurrecting Ghosts of PardonsPast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, at 26 (discussing, inter
alia, "[tihe appearance of a quid pro quo" (quoting Rep. Henry A. Waxman) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Don Van Natta Jr. & David Johnston, Clinton Library Will Yield Details on Big Donations,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at A9. The incident drew sharp criticism from Congress as well. See, e.g., 147
CONG. REC. S3154-56 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2001) (statement by Sen. Arlen Specter) (noting that Clinton's
last minute pardons had sparked public outrage and commenting that this was "tightly so").
42.
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000)).
43.
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.A.
(West 2005)).
44.
See John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Payingfor Politics,78 S. CAL. L. REV. 591, 593
(2005).
45.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
46.
The bans limit, inter alia,the value of gifts (meals and entertainment) that members of Congress
may accept from lobbyists (no individual gift may exceed $50 in value and no more than $100 in cumulative gifts may given by any one source) as well as prohibit senators and representatives from accepting
free travel to substantially recreational events such as charity trips where congressmen and lobbyists golf
and ski together to raise money for charities. See S. Res. 158, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. Res. 250, 104th
Cong. (1995).
47.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1604(b)(3) (2000) (requiring lobbying firms to include in their registration reports "a good faith estimate of the total amount of all income from the client (including any payments to
the registrant by any other person for lobbying activities on behalf of the client)"); id. § 1604(b)(4)
(requiring that registrants engaged in lobbying activities on their own behalves include in their registration reports "a good faith estimate of the total expenses that the registrant and its employees incurred in
connection with lobbying activities").
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Second, and perhaps more troubling to the public than the fear of outright bribery, is the special access, or inside edge, that lobbyists maintain in
communicating with elected officials. Whether because of the "revolving
door ' 48 or because of lobbyists' other close personal connections, 49 the public perceives that lobbyists receive special face time with elected officials.5 °
Irrespective of where that face time occurs-in scheduled meetings, on a
train ride, 5' over a game of poker, 52 or on the golf course 53 -itcreates opportunities for lobbyists to persuade elected officials of their clients' positions-opportunities that ordinary citizens do not have.54 In other words, the
48.
"Revolving door" is a term used to describe the common phenomenon whereby congressional
and executive staffers, and even some members of Congress and higher-level executive officials themselves, become lobbyists upon leaving public office. See, e.g., Michael Wines, For New Lobbyists, It's
What They Know, Not Whom They Know, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at B14 (reporting that "[o]f the 121
lawmakers who left Capitol Hill after [the November 1992 election]," forty-eight had become lobbyists
within one year, as had "at least 50 of their top aides [and] more than 30 senior officials" of the outgoing
Bush I Administration").
49.
Notably, some of the nation's top lobbyists are the relatives of current and former elected officials. For example, "Linda Hall Daschle, the wife of the [former Senate Minority Leader and herself] a
former top official at [the] Federal Aviation Administration, ... lobbie[d] on aviation issues" while her
husband was in office. Jill Abramson, The Business of Persuasion Thrives in Nation's Capitol, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at Al. Randy DeLay, brother of former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, once
was a lobbyist. Id. "The son of former Louisiana Senator J. Bennett Johnston is one of [Washington's]
most successful lobbyists," and Johnston and one of his top aides "joined his son in the business" following Johnston's retirement from Congress. Id. Michael Brown, the son of late Commerce Secretary Ron
Brown, is a lobbyist with one of D.C.'s best known lobbying firms, Patton Boggs. Deirdre Shesgreen,
Old, New Guard Court Williams, THE LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at 4. Renowned Washington lobbyist
Tommy Boggs is the son of the late Representative Hale Boggs. Frank N. Wilner, The Money Game,
TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 26, 1998, at 21.
50.
See, e.g., Martin Tolchin, Senators at HearingSupport a Bill To Tighten Lobbyist Restrictions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1986, at A32 (noting Senator David L. Boren's reports of "public concern over the
fact that some former officials earned as much as 20 times their former salaries [by becoming lobbyists]
within a short time of leaving government[,]" and that "some Oklahoma farmers attributed their problems in exporting farm products to the efforts of former officials who le[ft] government to become highpriced lobbyists"); Wines, supra note 48 (referencing a Public Citizen report labeling the revolving-door
phenomenon "government service for sale" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
51.
On a "Victory Train" going from Washington, D.C., to the 1992 Democratic convention in New
York, for example, "lobbyists paying several thousand dollars apiece rode for three hours with members
of Congress." See Charles Lewis, The Rainmakers in Bill's Parade,THE NATION, Dec. 7, 1992, at 693.
52.
Newspaper reports in 1995 outed Senator Alfonse D'Amato's long-standing tradition of hosting
Thursday night poker games in his office for "a small group of influential lobbyists and other Washington insiders.. . [including many who represent] banks, securities firms, credit unions, and other financial
institutions" with business before D'Amato's Banking Committee. Douglas Frantz & Jane Fritsch, HighStakes Poker Put Lobbyists Close to D'Amato's Ear,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at Al. Needless to say,
"the games were an extraordinary opportunity to reach a Senator whose actions are crucial to their clients." Id.
53.
See Damon Chappie, DeLay FoundationExploits New Rules, ROLL CALL, Jan. 20, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 3035720 (describing charity event in which lobbyists, business executives, and
elected officials golfed together to raise money for abused children).
54.
In the words of Representative Frank R. Lautenberg, "[tihe meal involves time, and time means
access. Ordinary citizens do not have that access." Salant & Sammon, supra note 22, at 2238 (quoting
Rep. Frank R. Lautenberg) (internal quotation marks omitted). Public Citizen Director Pamela Gilbert
similarly testified during hearings on the 1993 LDA that "the vast, vast majority of American citizens
never hire anybody to be able to wine and dine a Member of Congress, so you have a tremendous disadvantage. It is not a level playing field." Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 823 Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 202 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 LDA Hearing] (statement of Pamela Gilbert, Director, Public
Citizen's Congress Watch).
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public's concern is not just that elected officials will engage in blatant voteselling to lobbyists but, more subtly, that they will become partial to the
causes of lobbyists' clients because they spend a lot of time in lobbyists'
company. Public concern with the lobbying process thus reflects an underlying view that lobbyists have the ability-through some combination of
monetary and personal clout-to make elected officials forego their independent judgment and take actions that are in the lobbyists' clients' best
interests, as distinct from the interests of the general public.5"
2. The Gap Between the LDA and the Public's Concerns
Viewed from the above perspective, the LDA fails even to attempt to
address the public's concerns. First, although the public's misgivings about
the lobbying process focus on lobbyists' ability to command the attention of
and exert influence over elected officials, the LDA essentially leaves elected
officials out of the scope of its regulations. The Act requires disclosures
only from lobbyists, not elected officials, and even the information it demands of lobbyists is general and vague, revealing nothing about lobbyists'
contacts with any elected official.56 Disclosure requirements in the FECA
and the BCRA ensure that lobbyists at least must disclose their campaign
contributions to elected officials, but tying such disclosures to lobbyists'
activities on behalf of a particular client requires substantial crossreferencing and, in any event, reveals nothing about the amount or kind of
face time that individual lobbyists obtain vis-t-vis elected officials.
This focus on disclosures by and about lobbyists is, from the public's
standpoint, a little upside down. After all, the social contract upon which
our government is based is not between lobbyists and the public; it is between the public and its elected officials. It is elected officials, 57 not lobbyists, who are agents of the public, and who hold their positions and make
policy at the public's behest. If the public has an interest in knowing who is
exerting influence in the legislative game, that interest must stem from its
political contract with the officials it elects and from its desire to know how
those officials are executing their political charge-the public is interested
in lobbyists (and their clients) only to the extent that they interact with
elected officials and influence public policy. Particular lobbyists and their
clients are not the starting point of the public's concern; rather, citizens are
interested in whom their state representatives or the members of a particular
55.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the validity of such concerns in the related
context of campaign finance regulation. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 441 (2001) (acknowledging that corruption of the political process extends beyond explicit cashfor-votes agreements and includes "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment"). In McConnell v.
FEC, concerning the constitutionality of the BCRA, the Court specifically discussed corporate interests'
use of "donations to gain access to high-level government officials" and noted the "appearance" of
undue influence created by such access. 540 U.S. 93, 150 (2003).
56.
See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
57.
This includes, by extension, the staff, appointees, and others whom elected officials allow to
have input into their legislative policy decisions.
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congressional committee are meeting with, listening to, and otherwise consulting about policy decisions. Thus, it would make far more sense for the
LDA to require some disclosure about lobbyists' contacts with individual
elected officials, cross-referenceable by official, than it does for the Act to
require that lobbyists disclose their clients and fees, and list the legislative
chamber or executive department contacted on behalf of a client, crossreferenceable by lobbyist or client name. Indeed, the LDA differs in this
respect from its close cousins, the FECA and BCRA, which require candidates for elective office to make detailed58disclosures about the sources of
contributions to their political campaigns.
Second, and related to the first failure, the LDA fails to address the public's concerns about the purchasing of access to legislators, as distinct from
the outright purchasing of votes. Further, it ignores the perceived disparity
between the access that elected officials afford to well-connected lobbyists
and the wealthy interests who are able to hire them versus to ordinary members of the public and less wealthy interests. That is, the Act in no way attempts to level the playing field between moneyed and not-so-moneyed
interests in the lobbying game. In fact, if anything, the LDA seems to promote inequalities between such groups: notably, one of its provisions effectively prohibits certain nonprofit organizations, known as 501(c)(4)s, from
lobbying or hiring lobbyists by denying them federal funds if they engage in
lobbying activities. 59
The LDA does minimally address the revolving-door problem by placing a one-year ban on lobbying by former members or elected officials of
Congress. 6° But it does not preclude such individuals from advising clients
on lobbying strategy during this one-year cooling-off period or from letting
their names be dropped by clients seeking to gain access to a friendly bureaucratic ear.61 Further, because the restrictions that the Act does impose
last only for one year, it follows that once that year has passed, elected officials can lobby the very committees and offices in which they formerly
served, no matter how high a post they once held. 62 While there may be legitimate reasons for allowing, or even desiring, such insiders to serve as

58.
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (2000) (stating disclosure requirements
for individual candidates' political committees); id. § 434(c), (e), (f) (requiring disclosure by individuals
and entities under certain circumstances). The FECA also initially required individuals making contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 to file a statement with the Federal Election Commission. See Pub.
L. No. 92-225, § 302, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
59.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1611 (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2000)). Specifically, the Act provides
that any civic league or nonprofit organized for the promotion of social welfare will lose all federal
grants, loans, or other awards if it engages in lobbying activities. Compare id., with 26 U.S.C. §
501 (c)(4).

See 18 U.S.C. § 207(e) (2000).
60.
See Wines, supra note 48.
61.
62.
Former Senate Energy Committee Chairman J. Bennett Johnston became a lobbyist in 1996, as
did one of his top aides; "[tiheir client roster brims with energy interests." Abramson, supra note 49.
Ann M. Eppard, once a top aide to former House Transportation Committee Chairman Bud Shuster,
similarly left her job in 1994 to become a transportation lobbyist. See id.
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lobbyists on policy matters in their areas of expertise, 63 the practice as currently condoned feeds the public's vision of a small cadre of hired-gun lobbyists controlling public policy, on their clients' terms, without regard for
anyone else's interests.
Gift ban resolutions similarly address only the quid pro quo problem but
not the purchase of access to elected officials: Although they bar lobbyists
from paying for officials' meals or travel expenses, the resolutions cannot
and do not ban elected officials from socializing with lobbyists (e.g., at
charity golf or skiing events organized by lobbyists to benefit causes supported by elected officials). Nor do the gift ban resolutions forbid lobbyists
from inviting elected officials to speak at events that they host. 64 Thus, the
resolutions do not eliminate moneyed interests' special access to legislators;
they only limit such interests' ability to shower small favors upon legislators.
Finally, the LDA's weak enforcement provisions thwart the public's
underlying desire to hold elected officials and, perhaps to a lesser extent
lobbyists and their clients, accountable for lobbying improprieties. The
sanctions created by the LDA apply only to lobbyists, 65 not the elected officials who are the focal point of the public's concerns or the interests whom
the lobbyists represent. In addition, prosecutions under the Act are so few
and far between 66 that there is little incentive for lobbyists to make adequate
disclosures even of the little information they are required to report. 67 Further, there is no way for the public to learn about underreporting or other
violations of the Act unless the House Clerk or Secretary of the Senate decides to divulge this information. 68 The House and Senate gift ban resoluSee discussion infra Part G.C.
63.
64.
See S. Res. 158, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995) (amending Senate Rule XXXV).
65.
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1605(8), 1606.
See, e.g., Kate Ackley, LDA Enforcement: Is It Strong Enough?, ROLL CALL, June 27, 2005,
66.
available at 2005 WLNR 10116594 (quoting comment by a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office
that there have been "few" prosecutions related to the LDA); Kenneth P. Doyle, Senate Passed 2,000
Possible LDA Violations To DOJ, Dodd Reports; DOJ Pursued 13 Cases, BNA MONEY & POLITICS
REP., Feb. 14, 2006 (recounting DOJ report that it has pursued possible enforcement action in only
thirteen lobbying-reporting-violation cases since 2003); Carl Weiser, Enforcement of Law Almost NonExistent, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 16, 1999, at 1IA (reporting that between January 1, 1996, when the LDA
took effect, and the date of the article in November 1999, "no lobbyist ha[d] been prosecuted or referred
for prosecution [under the Act,]" and commenting that "no one knows whether lobbyists are complying
with the law").
See, e.g., Editorial, High Fives in the Skybox, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 18, 2005, at 8
67.
(noting that "[e]ven lobbyists on Washington's K street corridor have said they view the act as 'voluntary '). The Center for Public Integrity conducted a study of lobby disclosure forms and "found that 20
percent of [such forms] were filed at least three months beyond the deadline. In fact ... 3,000 forms
were filed six months late and 1,700 [disclosure forms] were at least a year overdue." Eliza Newlin
Carney, Lobbyists in the Crossfire,CONG. DAILY, May 16, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 7653948.
68.
For most of the LDA's life, the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR), which oversees LDA
enforcement on the Senate side, has refused to make public the number of its LDA-related referrals to
the U.S. Attorney's Office, much less to provide any details about individual cases. See Ackley, supra
note 66; Doyle, supra note 66. In a Senate Rules and Administration Committee meeting held on February 7, 2006, in the wake of the Abramoff and DeLay scandals, the SOPR for the first time reported that,
between 2003 and early 2006, it referred over 2,000 cases of possible LDA violations to the Justice
Department; the Justice Department responded that it has received only about 200 such referrals. Doyle,
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tions suffer from similar flaws because although the resolutions do require
disclosures from elected officials themselves, they too are subject to 69lax
enforcement and widespread noncompliance, as proved by recent events.
C. Why Congress Optedfor Symbolic Reform
Why do the regulations imposed by the LDA fall so short of addressing
the public's concerns? Is Congress unaware of the public's views, or has it
simply chosen to ignore them? This subpart argues that Congress's failure
to enact lobbying regulations more closely satisfying the public's concerns
is the result of a confluence of three factors: congressional sensitivity to
constitutional constraints involving the First Amendment, substantial differences in congressional versus public perceptions of lobbying, and selfinterested legislator behavior.
1. FirstAmendment Concerns
First Amendment concerns are the reason that Congress typically gives
to explain why the LDA is structured as a disclosure statute, rather than a
conduct-regulating statute, and why the Act lacks strong enforcement
mechanisms. 70 Irrespective of what the public might want, Congress understands-and to some extent hides behind-the fact that it cannot prohibit, or
even substantially restrict, substantive lobbying practices without violating
citizens' First Amendment rights of petition, speech, and association. 7 1 First
supra note 66.
See, e.g., Mary Curtius & Chuck Neubauer, DeLay Reports 5 Trips Last Year-All in U.S., L.A.
69.
T)MES, June 16, 2005, at A29 (reporting that in the wake of the DeLay scandal, "other House members.
. .and staff members [began filing] a flurry of reports about past trips they [previously] had failed to
disclose"); Editorial, Lobby Control, ROLL CALL, June 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 9072447
(reporting that to date, members of Congress "have ignored [the LDA's] report-filing requirements and,
under scrutiny, are now scrambling to fulfill their obligations" and noting that Republicans' response to
criticism of DeLay's travel practices was, in effect, that "everybody does it").
70.
See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 1 (opening statement of committee chairman
John Bryant) (commenting that the 1993 LDA "is designed to provide for the effective disclosure of the
efforts of paid lobbyists to influence Federal, legislative, or executive branch officials in the conduct of
government actions so that the public can see what influences these important actions affecting their
lives while continuing to afford the fullest opportunity to the people to exercise their right to petition
their Government for a redress of grievances and to express their opinions freely and provide information to the Government"); 141 CONG. REC. H1703, H1704 (Sept. 6, 1995) (extension of remarks by Rep.
Lee H. Hamilton) ("Lobbying reform is needed, but it must be balanced. We must not reach too far and
try to restrict legitimate lobbying activities and public contact with Members of Congress. Almost any
attempt by the government to limit private and nongovernmental entities from using their own private
funds to lobby will be difficult due to the First Amendment."); see also Robert L. Koenig, Senator Offers
Legislation to Close Lobbying Loopholes, ST. LOUIS POST- DISPATCH, Feb. 28, 1992, at 16A (reporting
comments by Senator Carl Levin that lobbying is protected by the First Amendment and that "[t]he way
to protect the public interest is through disclosure" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
First Amendment issues raised by lobbying regulations are discussed more fully infra Part
71.
HI.C.2. In brief, the concern is that "[t]he First Amendment protects [the] right not only to advocate
[one's] cause but also to select what [one] believe[s] to be the most effective means for so doing[,]"
including hiring a lobbyist. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988); see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991) (First Amendment freedom of expression protects the decision whether
to engage in or hire someone to engage in political lobbying). Legislative restrictions on political advo-

2007]

Interest-Group-Based Approach to Lobbying Regulation

529

Amendment concerns, for example, are behind the Act's failure to place
72
caps on the dollar amounts that a group may spend for lobbying activities
or to restrict campaign contributions by those who engage in lobbying activities.7 3 They also explain the weakness of the penalties imposed for
noncompliance with the LDA's disclosure requirements: the previous
lobbying regulation statute, the 1946 Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
(FRLA), had imposed criminal penalties and prohibited future lobbying by
those found to have violated its provisions, and these penalties widely had
been criticized as constitutionally suspect. 74 Further, First Amendment
arguments formed the focal point of interest group opposition to proposed
LDA provisions that would have required disclosure of grassroots lobbying
activities.75 But First Amendment concerns do not explain why the LDA
cacy or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation thus violate the First Amendment, whether those
restrictions are placed directly on those who seek to benefit from the passage or defeat of legislation or
on those who are hired to advocate on others' behalves. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).
Even disclosure requirements can run afoul of the First Amendment if their effect is to chill citizens'
exercise of their right to advocate or of their fight to associate for fear that public exposure of their
affiliation with a particular position or interest group might result in adverse economic or private consequences. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Baird v. State
Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971). For detailed treatments of how lobbying is protected under the First
Amendment, see David E. Landau, Public Disclosure of Lobbying: Congress and AssociationalPrivacy
After Buckley v. Valeo, 22 How. L.J. 27 (1979); Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the Pressure on Pressure
Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149 (1993); and Steven
A. Browne, Note, The Constitutionality of Lobby Reform: Implicating Associational Privacy and the
Right to Petitionthe Government, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 717 (1995).

72.
See Browne, supra note 71, at 729-47.
73.
The Senate in 1992 considered enacting a law that would have prohibited lobbyists from making
political contributions to any candidate or elected official whom they had lobbied within the past year,
but the bill died amidst serious concern that it would violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., 139 CONG.
REc. S6655, S6657 (May 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen) (questioning constitutionality of the
proposed law).
74.
The 1946 Act contained a provision that made violations of the Act a misdemeanor, punishable
by a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment of up to twelve months, and prohibited persons who were convicted
of violating the Act from engaging in lobbying activities for a subsequent period of three years. See 2
U.S.C. § 269(a)-(b), repealed by Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-65, § 1 (a), 109 Stat.
701. The District Court for the District of Columbia found this provision to be "obviously unconstitutional" on the ground that a person convicted of a crime cannot for that reason be stripped of his constitutional privileges, including the right to petition the government. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. McGrath,
103 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D.D.C. 1952), vacated by McGrath v. National Ass'n of Mfrs., 344 U.S. 804
(1952). Although the Supreme Court later vacated this ruling and found the 1946 FRLA constitutionally
valid, it left for another day the question of whether the Act's penalty provisions were constitutional. See
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 627 (1954). Most scholars and commentators continue to view
such sanctions as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald M. Levin & Theodore Ruger,
ConstitutionalIssues Raised by the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 1, at 143, 149 (calling the sanction "highly questionable" and applauding Congress for abandoning
its use in the 1995 LDA).
75.
See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14,207, S14,208 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994) (statements of Sen. Dole)
(discussing request by certain members of Congress to remove grassroots regulations from conference
report for 1993 LDA because of "wide" and "diverse" interest group concern that the Act's grassroots
lobbying provisions "will seriously impair our ability to exercise our rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 140 CONG. REC. H10,283, H10,291 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Doolittle) (criticizing grassroots lobbying provisions as a "gag rule" that
"will have a chilling effect on free speech" and citing diverse list of grassroots groups opposed to the
legislation, including the ACLU, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Defenders of Property Rights, and the
Christian Coalition). The concerns expressed were that regulation of grassroots lobbying would result in
the disclosure of interest groups' membership lists and possibly chill the political participation of religious organizations. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S 10,654, S 10,654 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of
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But First Amendment concerns do not explain why the LDA leaves Congress out of the lobbying equation, focusing all of its disclosure requirements exclusively on lobbyists. Nor do they explain the Act's failure to address the public's concerns about lobbyist access to elected officials. To
understand these omissions, it is necessary to consider the dynamics of the
legislative process, and the role of lobbying therein.
2. Differences in Congressionalv. Public PerceptionsAbout Lobbying
One overlooked, but key, reason for the disjunct between public concerns about lobbying and the LDA's actual provisions is that Congress's
conception of lobbyists and their role in the legislative process differs significantly from the public's. While the public views lobbyists as soulless
mercenaries, skilled at arm-twisting and bribing legislators into appeasing
their clients' interests at the expense of the public good, 76 members of Congress, for the most part, view lobbyists as invaluable policy experts who
provide elected officials with useful information about the underlying subjects of proposed legislation.77 Broadly speaking, the public seems to have
adopted a "pluralist '78 view of the lobbying process in which interest
groups-through their hired lobbyists-barter in the political marketplace to
obtain the best possible package of goods and services for themselves with
Sen. Smith) (discussing concern that prior version of bill containing grassroots lobbying provision
threatened to "make grass roots lobbyists divulge their entire mailing lists"); Jonathan D. Salant, House
Postpones Vote On Tougher Rules, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3589, 3589 (1995) (noting that Republicans had opposed the LDA in the prior year because they believed it "could limit the political participation of religious organizations by forcing them to disclose their grass-roots lobbying efforts"). Because
of the vociferous opposition to such regulation, the final version of the LDA passed in 1995 contains no
regulation of grassroots lobbying. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,099, H13,103 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Bryant) (presenting the 1995 LDA for consideration and noting that the prior year's
"controversial" grassroots lobbying provision was not in the current bill); 141 CONG. REc. S15,513,
S15,514 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of bill sponsor Sen. Levin) (explaining that "[w]e struck
any reference to grassroots lobbying from the lobbying reform bill this year in order to make progress").
76.
See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Lobbyist Disclosure Is Backed in Senate; Gift Issue Is Put Off, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1995, at AI (quoting comment by Senator William S. Cohen indicating that a perception
had developed "that just a few key people are being paid very high dollars in order to shape and influence and alter public policy in ways that are very damaging to the overall good of the country" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
77.
See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 127 (statement by Rep. Barney Frank) (commenting that he finds lobbyists to be "very useful sources of information"); Clymer, supra note 76 (reporting that Senator Cohen "defended lobbyists as providing an important, democratic service"); David
Shribman, Lobbying: Business by Nuance, Feint and Gamble, N.Y. TiEs, Nov. 21, 1981, at 11 [hereinafter Shribman, Lobbying] (quoting comment by Representative John J. LaFalce, D-NY, that legislators
"almost by definition, have to be generalists, but.., also have to deal with very technical issues requiring the skills of specialists" and that lobbyists provide such useful specialized information (internal
quotation marks omitted)); David Shribman, Lobbyists Proliferate-SoDo the Headaches,N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1982, at E5 [hereinafter Shribman, Lobbyists Proliferate](reporting that "members of Congress
admit they depend upon lobbyists to brief them on issues," and that "with the work of Congress reaching
into increasingly technical areas, individual members often feel they are unable to sort out issues without
[lobbyists]").
78.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 3233 (1985) (explaining that under the pluralist view of politics, the legislative process consists of competition between various "self-interested groups for scarce social resources").
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little thought for the broader public interest. 79 Congress, by contrast, seems
to subscribe to a "deliberative" model of the legislative process 80 in which
lobbyists, motivated by their clients' best interests, present specialized information to elected officials who take that information into account when
debating various policy proposals and then come to their own conclusions
about how best to serve the public good. 81
Congress is aware of the public's opinions and concerns about the lobbying process, but considers these opinions to be uninformed and misguided. 82 Elected officials, for instance, firmly (and sometimes vexedly)
reject the popular notion that lobbyists direct or control their policy decisions.83 Similarly, the revolving door that is so reviled by the public does
not seem such a bad thing to members of Congress, because it means that
See, e.g., Clymer, supra note 76 (quoting comment by Senator Carl Levin that public opinion
79.
polls show that "a majority of Americans feel that lobbyists are the real power in Washington, only 22
percent believe it's Congress, and only 7 percent the President" (internal quotation marks omitted));
David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Refuses to Weaken Bill to Limit Gifts from Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
1994, at Al (referencing a 1992 New York Times/CBS News poll finding that "75 percent of [American] adults said the Government was run by a few big interests, while only 19 percent said it was run for
the benefit of all the people").
80.
See Sunstein, supra note 78, at 46-47 (describing civic republicanism, or deliberative, concept of
representative government as one in which elected officials engage in a careful process of informationgathering, discussion, and debate, from which a common good ultimately emerges).
See, e.g., Lobbyists Praisedby Bono for Their Efforts to Educate Congress,COMMUNICATIONS
81.
DAILY, Feb. 22, 1996 [hereinafter Lobbyists Praised], available at 1996 WLNR 3292400 (quoting
Representative Bono's observations that "'education by lobbyists' is very valuable to Congress and after
lobbyists have done their work, 'ethics take over' when members decide how to vote on issues" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Shribman, Lobbying, supra note 77 (quoting comment by Representative
Henry A. Waxman that "[1]obbyists help us see the full impact of legislation we might adopt" but indicating that he knows to be "sensitive to the fact that they often think their self-interest and the public
interest are the same thing" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (quoting explanation by Representative John J. LaFalce that "[w]e often have to turn to lobbyists for information" but that he knows how to
"use lobbyists rather than have the lobbyists use [him]" and how to "get the perspective of lobbyists who
differ with each other"); Shribman, Lobbyists Proliferate,supra note 77 (reporting, based on interviews
with members of Congress, that legislators "listen to lobbyists representing more than one side of an
issue and proceed to make their decisions" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 126-27 (statement by Rep. Barney Frank) ("Peo82.
ple who think that adopting the most stringent forms of regulation and disclosure will materially change
the public policy of this country are wrong. I think there is a misperception that public policy is shifted
more by this than, in fact, is the case .... "); Rosenbaum, supra note 79 (reporting that senators had said
they "knew they were honorable public servants and that they should stop beating up on themselves to
vanquish a misguided public perception" that their votes could be bought); see also Michael Wines,
House HardensRule on Lobbyists; Bans Accepting Gifts From Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1994, at AI
(reporting legislator comments on the House floor indicating that they had been wounded "by the mistaken perception that they can be swayed by free skiing vacations, tickets to National Football League
games and dinners in four-star restaurants").
See, e.g., 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 196 (statements of Rep. John Bryant) ("What I
83.
am concerned about, though, is the impression that is constantly given is that Members are induced to
make different decisions after they have been elected and come here simply because somebody is taking
them to dinner or spending funds on them. ... I really think it is wrong of you and wrong of anyone to
suggest that this place changes its mind because of things like that."); S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 27 (1946)
(Senate Judiciary Committee report disdainfully referencing those who come to Washington "under the
false impression that they exert some powerful influence over Members of Congress"); LESTER W.
MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS 352 (1963) (congressional respondents in a study reported
that other factors are more important in shaping policy outcomes than lobbying); Lobbyists Praised,
supranote 81 (quoting Representative Bono's comment that although lobbyists help educate members of
Congress, members make their own independent decisions about how to vote on legislation).
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elected officials and government employees who have developed expertise
in a particular policy area can continue to share their knowledge with Congress even after they have left government service. 84 In fact, members of
Congress have been known to rely on lobbyists, revolving-door and otherwise, for help in writing speeches and even drafting parts of legislation.85
Thus, in enacting the LDA, Congress neither wanted to nor saw a need to
change many aspects of the lobbying process that troubled the public. Accordingly, when drafting lobbying regulations, Congress tended to focus on
superficially appeasing, rather than substantively addressing, the public's
concerns about this practice. That is, Congress wanted to enact lobbying
regulation in order to repair its image with the-in its view misinformedpublic, but it wanted to do so without substantially changing the way that
lobbying is practiced. This explains why, for example, Congress drafted the
LDA to impose a one-year ban on revolving-door lobbying rather than banning such lobbying outright, as the public might have preferred,86 and why
legislators, in drafting the House and Senate gift ban resolutions, themselves
commented that these reforms were designed to address the public's misconceptions
but were unlikely to effect real change in the lobbying proc87
ess.
Congress does have its own concerns about the lobbying process, but
these concerns differ substantially from those expressed by the public. Unsurprisingly, the primary congressional concern is about protecting members of Congress from harassment by lobbyists. As then-Senator John F.
Kennedy once wrote, "[T]he problem is pressure on the legislative branch
of the Government., 88 In Congress's view, although some lobbyists can be
valuable information sources, the sheer number and ubiquity of lobbyists
can make interacting with them exacting and confusing for elected officials.
84.
See, e.g., Tolchin, supra note 50 ("We do not want to prevent a person from using his expertise
and his knowledge when he leaves the government." (quoting David H. Martin, Director, Office of
Government Ethics) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85.
See CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting lobbyist Charles Walker's
descriptions of last-minute phone calls from legislators asking for speech-writing help); Wines, supra
note 48 (noting that "Jan Schoonmaker, a revolving-door lobbyist[,] ... has twice helped House appropriators write legislative language").
86.
Similarly, nothing in the LDA prevents former members of Congress from lobbying executive
branch agencies that they once supervised as committee members. The same is true of former executive
branch officials, who can lobby Congress unbridled.
87.
See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 79 (quoting Senator J. Bennett Johnston's comment that "[t]he
assumption is that if we pass this bill, somehow it will satisfy the American public who has unjustly
believed that we can be bought for a sack of fruit" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wines, supra
note 82 (noting that Representative John Bryant "and many other lawmakers said their behavior would
not change because they do not socialize with lobbyists nearly as much as the public believes"); see also
Adam Clymer, G.O.P. FilibusterDeals a Setback to Lobbying Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al
(quoting comment by then-Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole that "[w]e're prepared to correct all the
abuses, real or perceived, that have tarnished the credibility of Congress's" (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Wines, supra note 82 (quoting comment by lobbyist Allen Klein that "[the
House gift resolution]'s going to have a positive effect on the public perception, but it's going to have a
very limited effect on the way business is done here" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88.
John F. Kennedy, CongressionalLobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEO. L.J. 535,
556 (1957).
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Thus, the aim of lobbying regulation, from Congress's perspective, is to
help level the playing field between lobbyists, who hold all of the information, and elected officials, who hold none-by, for example, forcing lobbyists to identify the interests on whose behalf they are advocating so that
elected officials will know who is behind the data (and pressure) that they
are receiving.89
House and Senate reports studying the lobbying process also reveal a
congressional concern about the unequal access obtained by big business
versus less affluent interests. A House Select Committee Report on Lobbying published in 1950, for example, acknowledged that "the advantage in
lobbying would always lie with those interests which [are] best organized,
best financed, and had the easiest access to mass media of communication"
and that, for this reason, "[o]rganized business has always gained the most
from lobbying." 90 The problem with this disparity is that it skews the spectrum of information presented to legislators and, therefore, the shape of public policy. As Congress has recognized, "[flacts are seldom presented for
their own sake, or without having been carefully selected for maximum
impact," and it is only "where a full hearing is available for all interested
groups" that Congress can "rely on competitive watchfulness and public
scrutiny as partial safeguards against misrepresentation of the facts by any
one group."' 1 But, concluding that it had no feasible way to remedy this
situation, Congress essentially abandoned this concern when contemplating
the shape of lobbying regulation
and focused instead on obtaining more
92
information from lobbyists.
Thus, whereas the public views lobbyists as dangerous influencepeddlers who create deleterious effects in the policymaking process, Congress views them as useful, if sometimes annoying, political actors without
whom the legislative system could not function.93 Given these divergent
underlying assumptions, the goals that Congress seeks to accomplish
through lobbying regulations differ substantially from the public's ideal.
Factor in Congress's dismissiveness of the public's "misinformed" views,
tempered by its electoral obligation to address the public's concerns, and
symbolic legislation is the unsurprising result.

89.
See H.R. REP. No. 81-3138, at 30 (1950) [hereinafter 1950 House Report] ("The all-pervading
purpose and intent of the Lobbying Act was to bring into the open activities intended to influence legislation, directly and indirectly, and to provide full public disclosure of the financing and expenditures
involved in these activities."); Kennedy, supra note 88, at 566.
90.
1950 House Report, supra note 89, at 63.
91.
Id. at 27.
92.
Id. at 66 (rejecting proposals for leveling playing field between wealthy and less wealthy interests and stating: "We need more information on lobbying and lobbyists. This, at the moment, is the most
feasible approach. Every group has the right to present its case, but at the same time Congress and the
public have a right to know who they are, what they are doing, how much they are spending, and where
the money is coming from ....What is needed is that this act be equipped to fulfill more effectively the
purposes for which it was designed.").
93.
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 88, at 566 (calling lobbyists the "third chamber" and praising the
"real contribution they make to the legislative process").
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3. LegislatorSelf-Interest
Beyond philosophical differences in congressional versus public perceptions of lobbying, legislator self-interestedness also seems to have
played a significant role in shaping the symbolic LDA. Basic game theory
tells us that legislators can be expected to maximize their own self-interest
when enacting lobbying regulations, and this is precisely what seems to
have occurred with the LDA. First, despite their central role in the lobbying
process, legislators distanced themselves from the LDA's regulatory burdens, instead placing the entire onus of the Act's disclosure requirements on
lobbyists. Second, despite the public's deep distrust of lobbying practices,
legislators constructed the LDA in a manner that leaves lobbyists' contacts
with elected officials both unregulated and undisclosed, thereby protecting
their own ability to obtain the benefit of lobbyists' expertise, information,
and assistance in drafting speeches and legislation-without the public's
knowledge. Further, legislators imposed only the most minimal of revolving-door restrictions upon themselves, requiring former members of Congress and their committee staff to wait only one year before lobbying (and
providing information and legislative assistance to) members of the committees on which they once served.
Id. BEYOND SYMBOLISM: THE PROMISE OF MORE RESPONSIVE
LOBBYING REFORM

A. Is Symbolism Enough?
Given legislators' incentives, one might wonder whether symbolism
might not be the most that we can expect from Congress in the context of
lobbying regulation. Indeed, symbolism has much to recommend it: Congress certainly is correct in its view that the public lacks an accurate understanding of the beneficial role lobbyists can play in the legislative process,
and symbolism allows Congress to satisfy the public's concerns superficially as well as to correct its own informational disadvantages vis-A-vis
lobbyists, without disrupting those aspects of the lobbying process that it
believes work well. Moreover, disclosure-an inherently symbolic form of
regulation-may be the only method of lobbying regulation permissible
under the First Amendment.
While there is nothing wrong with symbolism per se, the LDA's approach to lobbying regulation-an approach that has been accepted without
question by those who seek to reform the lobbying process-leaves something to be desired. First, the Act's approach discounts the public's concern
with lobbyist access to elected officials, focusing almost exclusively on the
financial aspects of lobbyists' activities. 94 As a result, the disclosures that
94.
Significantly, lobbyists themselves confirm the public's concerns, stating that their objective is
to ensure access to policy makers and that they make contributions to help them gain access, not to buy

2007]

Interest-Group-Based Approach to Lobbying Regulation

535

current regulations produce are incomplete and provide no information with
which to gauge any correlation between lobbyists' and interest groups'
monetary contributions and their legislative access. In this respect, the LDA
falls far short of achieving its own symbolic goals of increasing public
awareness about the lobbying process and improving public confidence in
the integrity of government.
Second, the LDA's lax enforcement provisions leave substantial room
for lobbyists to circumvent its disclosure requirements through incomplete,
intentionally vague, and even egregiously late filings. Further, they enable
lobbyists and interest groups, working together, to avoid full disclosure by
registering an affiliate or coalition name rather than a recognizable interest
group name under the "client" category with little fear of detection, let alone
sanction.95
Third, even if the LDA's disclosure requirements had been sufficient to
satisfy the public's needs when enacted, Congress's passage of the BCRA
in 2002 at least arguably made more aggressive lobbying disclosure necessary. In restricting interest groups' ability to make campaign contributions,
BCRA closed off one prominent tactic used by interest groups to obtain
political access to elected officials. 96 Because money is fungible, cutting off
its use in one political arena inevitably will lead to increased expenditures in
another;97 thus, if the law limits how much interests can spend on campaigns, interests presumably will begin to spend more on other political
activities, including lobbying.98 This, in turn, means that the political stakes
associated with lobbying will increase and that lobbying likely will play an
increasingly significant role in the legislative process.
Ultimately, then, the problem with the LDA's approach is not merely
that it is symbolic but that it offers only a narrow, static solution to a dynamic problem. The Act's approach assumes that requiring minimal disclosures about lobbyists' clients, fees, and issue areas automatically will result
the votes of elected officials. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 29, at 267. While this statement should, of
course, be taken with a grain of salt given its self-serving nature, it undoubtedly describes at least some
lobbyists' behavior.
95.
This problem is discussed in greater detail infra Part I.B.2.
96.
Before BCRA, interest groups could circumvent legal caps on contributions to political candidates by donating unlimited amounts to political parties, who in turn passed this money on to their candidates. See, e.g., Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 HARv. L. REV.
1323, 1324-26 (1998). BCRA makes such "soft money"-money not subject to a contribution capcontributions unavailable to political parties and, thereby, political candidates by subjecting all political
party expenditures to contribution limits. See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2000); see also de Figueiredo & Garrett,
supra note 44, at 598-99.
97.
For an excellent discussion of this hydraulics principle, see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1715-16 (1999), noting,
for example, that "[clampaign money is increasingly seeking the path of least resistance."
98.
Cf. Jeffrey Milyo, Bribes and Fruit Baskets: What Does the Link Between PAC Contributions
and Lobbying Mean?, 4 BUS. & POL. 157, 158-59 (2002) (citing Micky Tripathi, Stephen Ansolabehere
& James M. Snyder Jr., Are PAC Contributionsand Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995
Lobby Disclosure Act, 4 Bus. & POL. 131, 135-55 (2002)) (noting that expenditures on lobbying and
PAC contributions tend to move in tandem and arguing that there is strong empirical support indicating
that PAC contributions, like lobbying, are used to gain access to elected officials).
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in greater public respect for the lobbying system, but ignores the manner in
which different political players interact with each other in the lobbying
process as well as the manner in which the public obtains and processes
political information. In order to achieve more effective lobbying reform,
we need a disclosure system that appreciates the incentives that motivate
different political entities-legislators, interest groups, lobbyists, the media,
and the public-and that accounts for how these entities interact with each
other. We need a system that produces disclosures relevant to the public,
ensures the accuracy of these disclosures, and channels such disclosures to
the public in an accessible way so that voters can make more informed electoral decisions and hold their elected officials accountable for their legislative and lobbying behavior. Such a dynamic system of lobbying regulation
could benefit the public and the legislative process in a number of ways,
beginning with increased voter competence and more informed (balanced)
legislating.
B. Voter Competence
Voter competence is a crucial component of any democratic government that claims to be run based on the consent of the governed. Voting is,
of course, the only form of control that most citizens can exercise over those
who make public policy decisions with often far-reaching private consequences. It stands to reason that if voting is conducted based on inadequate
or inaccurate information, then voters will not get the government they expect (or will not expect the government that they get), and public confidence
in the political process accordingly will disintegrate. Hence, disclosure statutes are justified in part on the theory that they provide useful information
to citizens and legitimize the political process, as illustrated by the preamble
to the LDA 99 and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the campaign finance context.1°° But if this is their purpose, then the information elicited by
disclosure statutes should be that which is most helpful to citizens in deciding how to vote. 0 1

99.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (listing congressional findings that "(1) responsible representative
Government requires public awareness of the efforts of paid lobbyists to influence the public decisionmaking process" and "(3) the effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid
lobbyists to influence Federal officials in the conduct of Government actions will increase public confidence in the integrity of Government").
100.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (citing, inter alia, state interest in "providing
the electorate with information" as justification for BCRA's application of disclosure requirements to all
"electioneering communications"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (citing governmental
interests in "provid[ing] the electorate with information 'as to where political campaign money comes
from and how it is spent by the candidate"' and in "deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the
appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity" as
sufficient to justify intrusion on First Amendment rights by FECA's disclosure requirements (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 92-564, at 4 (1971))).
101.
See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled PoliticalActors and Campaign Disclosure
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005).
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As Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith have noted in the context of
campaign finance regulation, political scientists define voters as competent
"if they cast the same votes they would have cast had they possessed all
available knowledge about the policy consequences of their decision.
That is, if knowledge of Candidate X's position on 100 political issues
would render a voter competent in an election, then if Citizen A does not
know these facts and cannot access other facts that allow her to make the
same choice at the ballot box, she cannot vote competently. 10 3 But, on the
other hand, if there exists another, related, set of facts that leads her to make
the same choice she would have made had she known Candidate X's position on 100 political issues (e.g., the related fact that Candidate X is endorsed by the NRA) then knowledge of the full set of facts is not necessary
for Citizen A to cast a competent vote. 1 4 In other words, voters need not
possess all available information about a candidate in order to vote competently; they can instead "rely on particular pieces of information, connected
non-accidentally to accurate conclusions about the consequences of [their]
vote[s]" and still make competent electoral decisions. 0 5 Smaller, digestible,
"particular pieces of information" thus serve as cues, or heuristics, that enable citizens to vote competently with limited information.'l6
As the use of the NRA in the above example suggests, an incumbent's
or challenger's (if the challenger has held prior elective office) connection
to a particular interest group can serve as one important heuristic for voters.' 07 In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much when discussing the value of campaign finance rules requiring disclosure of the names of
those who have contributed to a candidate's campaign:

102.

Id. at 296 & n.3 (quoting Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct

Legislation Elections, in CrrTZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (Stephen L.

Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103.
See id. at 296 (citing Arthur Lupia & Richard Johnston, Are Voters to Blame? Voter Competence and Elite Maneuvers in Referendums, in REFERENDUM DEMOCRACY: CITIZENS, ELITES AND
DELIBERATION IN REFERENDUM CAMPAIGNS 191, 194-95 (Matthew Mendelsohn & Andrew Parkin eds.,

2001)).
104.
Id. (employing this example with the NRA, NARAL Pro-choice America, the Concord Coalition, and the Sierra Club).
105.
Id.
106.
See id. See generally Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "DisclosurePlus," 50 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (2003) (arguing
that strengthening heuristic cues in direct democracy is the best means for rehabilitating voter competence).
107.
Cf Kang, supra note 106, at 1157 (citing ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX:
INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 18 (1999), for the proposition
that the political orientation of many interest groups is well known); Arthur Lupia, Dumber than
Chimps? An Assessment of Direct Democracy Voters, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY? THE BAF7LE ovER

BALLOT INITIATIVES IN AMERICA 66, 69-70 (Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst & Bruce A. Larson eds.,
2001) (listing "interest-group endorsements," along with personal reputations and political ideologies, as
an example of an informational shortcut that voters may use to help themselves make electoral decisions
in ballot initiative context); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting
Behavior in CaliforniaInsurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 63, 71 (1994) (finding that
voters who were ignorant about the substantive content of insurance-related ballot initiatives, but knew
the interest group positions, voted almost exactly like substantively knowledgeable voters).
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[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information 'as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate' in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek
federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which
a candidate is most likely to be responsive
and thus facilitate pre10 8
dictions offuture performance in office.
In other words, knowledge of which interest groups an elected official is
most likely to pay attention to once in office can be a crucial factor in increasing voter competence. The most reliable predictor of such future behavior, of course, is a catalogue of those interests to which the candidate has
responded in the past-i.e., a list of his or her lobbying contacts while in
office thus far.
Meaningful, dynamic lobbying regulation thus must require some disclosure of elected officials' (and their staffs') 109 lobbying contacts with
particular interest groups so that the public can use this information to predict, reward, or punish its elected representatives' behavior. In order to
prove useful to the public, moreover, lobbying regulations must ensure that
the information disclosed (1) is accurate and (2) is presented in a form that
both is easily accessible to the public and is likely to garner the public's
attention. The accuracy of information about lobbying contacts obviously is
crucial, as incorrect or incomplete cues about the interests to which an
elected official responds could lead the public to draw erroneous conclusions about how to vote. As discussed earlier, t l° current lobbying regulations do nothing to ensure the accuracy or thoroughness of lobbyist disclosures, giving the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House no authority to investigate whether the information reported by lobbyists is true
or to catch entities who engage in lobbying activities but fail to register."t '
108.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)) (emphasis added).
109.
In order to obtain an accurate picture of lobbyists' access and opportunities to influence elected
officials, it is imperative that contacts with members of an elected official's staff be covered by disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 29, at 266 (explaining that the majority of the lobbyists
interviewed in her study of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee "considered lobbying staff a key part of their strategy" and opining that such meetings were at least as fundamental to an
interest group's success as were meetings with the chairmen and ranking members of the House Committee and Subcommittee themselves); E-mail from Bill Dauster, Democratic General Counsel, U.S.
Sen. Fin. Comm. (Aug. 23, 2005, 07:54 EST) (on file with the author).
110.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2 and accompanying notes.
111.
The LDA does give the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House authority to "review,
and, where necessary, verify and inquire to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of registration and reports," 2 U.S.C. § 1605(2) (2000), but that authority is different from, and falls short of,
conferring power to audit or investigate the information that lobbyists submit. See, e.g., Weiser, supra
note 66 (quoting comments by Pam Gavin, superintendent of the Senate office that collects lobbying
forms, indicating that "[w]e do not have the authority to investigate" and "[w]e only have the authority
to inquire," and noting that while House and Senate officials have power to write to lobbyists asking for
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This structure encourages incomplete and inaccurate reporting by lobbyists. 11 2 Lobbying reforms that strengthen the LDA's enforcement mechanisms and give real investigative authority to those charged with enforcing
the Act can change this unfortunate dynamic,' 13 increasing lobbyists' incentives to provide thorough and reliable information and thus helping to improve the accuracy of voting cues. Reforms that enable enforcers and the
public to cross-reference information disclosed under the Act-by, for example, comparing lobbyists' disclosures about their contacts with elected
officials (and officials' staff) against disclosures made by elected officials
and staff members themselves' 4 -also would enhance the reliability of the
information provided to the voting public.
In addition, the format of information disclosed under the LDA is integral to its usefulness as a voting heuristic. Most voters are disengaged from
politics and have little time or attention to devote to digesting information
disclosed by lobbyists; thus it is imperative that lobbying regulations be
designed to provide voters with "the information most crucial to improving
their ability to vote consistently with their preferences"'" 5 and to do so in a
format that readily translates into a voting cue. Current lobbying regulations
provide information in a decidedly non-voter-friendly manner: The disclosures required by the LDA offer no connection between lobbyists' activities
and the officials whom voters have elected, and the registration forms available online are searchable only by lobbyist name, client name, year filed, or
federal agency/congressional committee contacted (though, as indicated
above, lobbyists rarely list the names of the committees they have contacted)." 16 Lobbying reforms could ameliorate this problem in a number of
ways. First, they could require disclosure of lobbyist contacts with elected
officials and their staffs on behalf of specific interests, thereby giving voters
information that enhances their capacity to evaluate elected officials' conduct in office and increasing their ability to vote consistently with their
preferences. Second, reforms to the LDA could require maintenance of
online databases with better search and indexing capabilities to ensure that
voters have easier access to the information that concerns them most.
Interestingly, reforms requiring disclosure of the lobbyists and interest
groups who receive access to specific elected officials may even increase
voter respect for some elected officials by demonstrating that these officials
do, in fact, exercise independent judgment in making policy decisions. Such
might be the case if, for example, lobbying disclosures reveal that an offimore information and to notify the U.S. Attorney's office if a lobbyists is not complying, they would
"never know" if someone is lobbying but not reporting (internal quotation marks omitted)).
112.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
113.
See proposal discussed infra Part lI.B.3.b.
114.
See proposal discussed infra Part 1i.B.1, advocating that elected officials be required to file
disclosure statements estimating the amount of time spent meeting with specific lobbyists on behalf of
specific interests.
115.

Garrett & Smith, supra note 101, at 2.

116.

See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
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cial or his aides met with a particular group often but the official nevertheless voted against that group's legislative interests, or that an official or his
aides 7met with groups on both sides of an issue before deciding how to
vote."i
C. More Informed Legislating
As members of Congress have acknowledged," 18 lobbyists and the interests they represent play an important role in informing and educating
elected officials about the need for, and the effects of, specific policy decisions. But the information that officials receive is only as good as its source.
No one doubts that lobbyists and their clients present facts in the light most
favorable to their policy interests; 119 thus, the political, economic, or other
agendas of those interest groups whose hired lobbyists succeed in securing
the ear of elected officials (and their aides) inevitably affect the shape of the
public policy that is enacted. 20 Accordingly, the identity and views of the
lobbyists and interests with whom elected officials and their staff consult
are highly consequential features of the legislative process.
Relatedly, the relative ideological diversity of the lobbyists and groups
with which individual officials and their aides meet can be a crucial determinant of where along the political spectrum each official's policy preferences on particular issues will fall.1 2 1 Legal scholarship on the subject of
group polarization t 22 suggests that if an elected official consults with a homogenous set of interest groups representing only one side of an issue-

117.
Elected officials certainly behave in this manner in the campaign finance context, taking money
from interest groups on both sides of an issue and/or taking money from a group but voting against that
group's interests on legislation. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Medical Industry Showers Congress With
Lobby Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at Al (discussing, for example, contributions made to Representative Peter Stark).
118.
See supra notes 77, 81, and accompanying text.
119.
See, e.g., 1950 House Report, supra note 89, at 27 (noting that in lobbyists' communications
with members of Congress, "[flacts are seldom presented for their own sake, or without having been
carefully selected for maximum impact").
120.
See, e.g., John R. Wright, Contributions,Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 84 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (1990) (reporting results of an empirical study
demonstrating that Representatives' voting decisions in committee, particularly in the Ways and Means
Committee, bear a strong cor'elation to the number of lobbying contacts they received from groups on
either side of an issue).
121.
See, e.g., Evans, supra note 29, at 257-59 (concluding, based on a study of the House Public
Works and Transportation Committee's behavior during consideration of a highway reauthorization bill,
that interest groups are most effective at getting the majority of their policy preferences accepted when
they face no competition for elected officials' attention from opposing interests).
122.
Group polarization is a theory positing that "members of a deliberating group predictably move
toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies.
'[L]ike polarized molecules, group members become even more aligned in the direction they were already tending."' Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 74-75 (2000) (quoting JOHN C. TURNER Er AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 142 (1987));

see also Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 535-36 (2002) (citing Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Bumstein, Effects
of Partially Shared Persuasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 306-07 (1974)).
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whether because those interests contributed to his campaign or because
those interests share the official's political ideology-then the public policy
generated by that official will become polarized, or skewed in an extreme
direction, because the official is hearing from a "limited 'argument pool[]"'
whose ideas tend to feed off each other and push the official to an extreme
position. 23 Lobbying by coalitions of like-minded interest groups, a growing phenomenon,124 only makes this problem worse. Sunstein posits that
such polarization creates "deliberative trouble" because "widespread error
and social fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited
argument pools and parochial influences."'' 25 Thus, to the extent possible, it
is important to ensure that elected officials hear from interests on both sides
of a policy issue. 126 When elected officials, or the staff who make policy
recommendations to such officials, receive information from and hear the
concerns of interests on both sides of an issue, their policy positions are
likely to become tempered, balanced, and more informed-rather than polarized. Indeed, Sunstein speculates that polarization will end or reverse
when 1the
argument pool is expanded and new members add new argu27
ments.
Current lobbying regulations provide no mechanism or incentive for
such diversity of access because they reveal nothing about how individual
officials allocate access across different lobbyists and their interest group
clients. Lobbying reforms that require elected officials to disclose their contacts with particular lobbyists on behalf of particular interests, however,
would shed some light on whether a particular elected official takes all of
her cues from interests of a particular stripe or whether she gives audience
to interests on all sides of an issue. The threat of such exposure, moreover,
could encourage (or force) elected officials, or at least their staffs, to split
their dance cards more evenly between opposing interests for fear of how it
will look to the electorate, and other interest groups, if lobbying disclosures
reveal them to be unduly partial to one set of interests. Such a shaming
mechanism may be the most effective institutional method available to ensure that deliberating legislators do not isolate themselves from competing
views.

123.
124.

See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 104-05.
See Scott Ainsworth, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 475, 475 (2000) (reviewing KEVIN W. HULA,

LOBBYING TOGETHER: INTEREST GROUP COALITIONS IN LEGISLATIVE POLrIcS (2000)) (noting increase

in coalitions of interest groups).
125.
Sunstein, supra note 122, at 105.
126.
See, e.g., CONGRESS AND PRESSURE GROUPS, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting statement by ACLU
that "[wihen groups push on both sides of an issue, officials can more freely exercise their judgment than
when the groups push on only one side" (quoting MILBRATH, supra note 83, at 345) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
127.
See Sunstein, supra note 122, at 95-96.
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I1. How TO FIX THE LDA: INTEREST GROUPS, THE OVERLOOKED FACTOR
Lobbying regulations traditionally have paid little attention to interest
groups; in fact, the only portion of the LDA directed towards such groups is
the requirement that lobbyists disclose the names of their clients. 128 This is
because in focusing on lobbying regulation as a means of (1) combating
quid pro quo corruption, and the appearance thereof, and (2) protecting
elected officials from lobbyist harassment, 29 Congress has ignored the public's underlying concern with the preferential access and disproportionate
ability to influence legislative agendas that the lobbying process affords to
certain interests. Moreover, Congress has ignored the fact that interest
groups are the driving force behind the lobbying process and that, without
them, lobbyists would have no one to advocate for and no need to seek access to elected officials. This Part suggests that the LDA's ignorance of
interest groups' role in the lobbying process is almost as glaring an omission as the Act's failure to impose any regulations on elected officials. Indeed, given Congress's distorted incentives, a focus on interest groups may
well be the key to effecting meaningful lobbying regulation.
A. The Potential Impact of Greater Transparencyon
Interest GroupDynamics
In crafting lobbying reform, it is important to consider not only what
current regulations fail to achieve but also what incentives and consequences they succeed in producing. One oft-overlooked consequence of
current disclosure requirements is that they create a system through which
opposing interests can obtain information about their competitors' lobbying
activities. 130 Interest groups, unlike ordinary citizens, tend to be familiar
with the names of other interest groups; thus the LDA, in permitting the
public to look up lobbyist registration statements by client name, enables
interest groups to discover which lobbyists their competitors have hired,
how much their competitors have spent on lobbying, the general issues on
which their competitors' lobbying activities have focused, and even, to
some extent, the federal departments or congressional committees that have
been lobbied on their competitors' behalves. The Act thus provides organized interests with information they can use to step-up their own lobbying
efforts to match those of their competitors. Herein lies the great promise of
lobbying regulation: Instead of shuddering in horror at this realization, reformers should embrace it. That is, reformers should approach lobbying
reform with the view that since organized interest groups are the political
128.
See supra notes 31, 32, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 44, 88, 89, and accompanying text.
129.
130.
See, e.g., Gil Klein, 2 Push Congress to Get Cracking on Lobbying Bill, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1994, at A20 (noting that some lobbyists liked the then-draft LDA because "[b]y
requiring all lobbyists to disclose details of their business, competitors can check up on each other").

2007]

Interest-Group-Based Approach to Lobbying Regulation

543

actors with the greatest incentive to take advantage of disclosures in the
lobbying game, it is most efficient to structure lobbying regulations in a way
that makes it likely that, as these interests act to maximize their own best
interests, they also will further public goals. In other words, lobbying regulations should be designed to ensure that opposing interests get the kind of
information that will help them to counterbalance each other as well as encourage them to bring their competitors' disclosures to the public's attention-i.e., lobbying regulations should produce information not only about
which lobbyists competing interests hire, or how much those lobbyists are
paid, but also about the amount of access that those lobbyists obtain vis-Avis specific elected officials. This interest-group-based suggestion, of
course, dovetails naturally with the public's interest in learning how much
access its elected officials provide to particular lobbyists and their interest
group clients.
The aim should be to create a system through which interests groups
carefully can monitor their competitors' lobbying registration statements
and can use the detailed disclosures therein (1) to inform the public of any
disparities between the lobbying access granted to their competitors versus
to interests on their side and (2) to increase their own substantive lobbying
efforts to counterbalance the information provided by their competitors. In
this way, disclosures made under the LDA actively could be brought to the
public's attention and, at the same time, targeted efforts could be made by
interests themselves to force elected officials to listen to arguments on both
sides of an issue before making policy decisions. As a result, legislators
should be better informed and public policy should become more balanced.
What I am advocating, in other words, is that lobbying regulations embrace the familiar Madisonian concept of allowing factions to check factions in service of the public good. 13 1 The idea is to shift vigilance over lobbying activities away from members of the public, whom current regulations disingenuously assume will pay attention to lobbying disclosures of
their own initiative, and towards interest groups. Instead of relying on reactions from the all-too-often disengaged public, lobbying regulations should
rely on the normal workings of the political process-on competing interests' natural incentives to bring elected officials' contacts with lobbyists and
interest groups to the public's notice and to press officials to listen to groups
on both sides of an issue. This potential vigilance from within the political
process is, after all, what Madison heralded as the saving
grace of a large
32
interests.
varied
and
numerous
of
composed
republic
But the suggestion that would-be reformers use interest groups' natural
incentives to promote more balanced legislating is not purely utilitarian; I
do not advocate it because I believe it to be the only type of reform that will
work given the irremediable reality of interest group (faction) behavior.
131.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).

132.

Id.
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Rather, I believe that using competing interests to broaden elected officials'
views is a normatively good idea. As Sunstein has acknowledged in the
context of group polarization, the ideal solution to one-sided interest group
interactions with elected officials is not necessarily to eliminate private
group deliberation and ensure that all policymaking occurs within a large
and heterogeneous public sphere-indeed, such a solution would produce
the countervailing problem of drowning out minority viewpoints. 133 Instead,
some private "enclave deliberation" should continue to occur in order to
"increase the diversity of society's aggregate 'argument pool"' and protect
minority interests. 34 A system of lobbying regulation that employs competing interests to ensure that legislators hear from advocates on both sides of
an issue incorporates the best of both kinds of group deliberation: Majority
concerns and a variety of viewpoints can be brought to light on the House
and Senate floors and in conference committees, while enclave deliberation
by like-minded people with intense preferences on either side of an issue
can occur within interest groups themselves and in private meetings between elected officials and interest groups.
In addition to promoting equal access and more balanced legislating,
competing interests can and should be encouraged to use lobbying disclosures to increase voter competence. Voters are, for the most part, "civic
slackers," disengaged from politics and disinclined to spend their free time
learning about candidates for elective office, let alone combing lobbying
35
disclosure statements to uncover candidates' relationships with lobbyists.
Thus, they need "information entrepreneurs"1 36 to bring information to them
in an accessible and useful form. Interests groups are ideal information entrepreneurs because they have inherent incentives to examine lobbying disclosures thoroughly and to present information gleaned therefrom to voters
in terms that voters can understand and that relate directly to electoral issues. For example, a disfavored interest group might, in furtherance of its
own self-interest, seek to alert voters that, "CongressmanA met with representatives of the Gun Lobby X times for a total of Y hours last year but
never [or only once or only for Z hours] with groups favoring tougher
handgun regulation." Groups that enjoy the greatest power and access conversely might use the disclosed information to boast to their members about
how much access they receive, noting for example that, "Our gun lobbyists
spent 20 hours with Congressman B last year and the other side spent only
15 minutes with him. Look what great access we're getting. Keep those
checks coming!" Both such uses of lobbying disclosure would result in
greater public awareness of specific elected officials' contacts with lobby133.
Sunstein, supra note 122, at 105.
134.
Id. at 75,105.
135.
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 97, at 1727 (quoting Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic
Paradoxof Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 893, 901-02 (1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136.
See, e.g., Garrett & Smith, supra note 101, at 5.
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ists for specific interests and would provide the public with useful heuristic
cues about how specific elected officials are likely to approach various policy issues if (re)elected. Of course, lobbying reforms designed to encourage
interest groups to publicize lobbying disclosures in furtherance of their own
narrow political interests may result in soundbite-type dissemination of information about elected officials' lobbying contacts rather than in an impartial presentation of the facts. But at least such reforms would provide voters
with some information about lobbyists' access to elected officials-far more
than can be said of current lobbying regulations.
B. A + B = C: Interest Group Incentives + Public Goals =
New LDA Reforms
The preceding subpart describes the potential promise of using interest
group incentives to craft lobbying reforms designed to achieve the public
goals of voter competence, equal access, and more balanced legislating. But
how precisely should reformers go about harnessing interest group incentives? This subpart discusses some possibilities and compares lobbying reforms recently proposed in Congress with those dictated by an interestgroup-based approach to lobbying regulation.
1. Who and What Must Be Disclosed
a. Disclosureby Public Officials
First, lobbying regulations must require disclosure of the information
that is most useful to competing interests and the public. If, as I have suggested, interest groups care about the relative political access they receive to
elected officials, as compared to that received by their competitors, then
lobbying reforms cannot be effective unless they compel lobbyists to reveal
the extent of their lobbying contacts with individual elected officials. This
means that lobbying regulations must require disclosure not only of the particular elected officials and staff members whom a lobbyist has contacted,
but also of the approximate amount of time the lobbyist has spent with the
official or staff members. Further, in order to address the public's concerns
and enable interest groups to gauge the relative responsiveness of specific
officials, elected officials-in addition to lobbyists-should be required to
file lobbying disclosure statements listing the lobbyists (and their interest
group clients) with whom they have met, and approximating the aggregate
amount of time spent with each lobbyist or interest group. Such disclosures
should include a description of the general context of elected officials'
meetings with lobbyists (e.g., in-office, fundraiser, lunch, travel, golf
course). In fact, elected officials could be required to make an "office disclosure," listing the approximate aggregate amount of time spent by the
official and/or members of his staff in meeting with a particular lobbyist on
behalf of a particular client as well as breaking down that larger number into
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time spent with the official and time spent with staff. To avoid constitutional problems, these disclosures need not reveal the specifics of what was
discussed between lobbyists and elected officials, but need only describe the
issue or bill concerning which the lobbying contact was made. In addition,
time spent by officials or their staff reviewing informational reports or
memoranda provided by a lobbyist should
be listed on the disclosure form
137
so as to avoid circumvention problems.
Mandatory disclosures of elected officials' contacts with lobbyists
would provide interest groups with a method for evaluating their success,
vis-A-vis opposing interests, in gaining access to specific elected officials.
Indeed, disclosures of this kind would enable interests to discover patterns
in an elected official's lobbying contacts, as well as to identify particular
officials whom they may have overlooked and whom they may wish to devote additional resources educating in the future, in order to counterbalance
their competitors' efforts. In addition, such disclosures would enable other
interested parties, including candidates for elective office and the press, to
act as information entrepreneurs and bring data about an incumbent's lobbying contacts to the public's attention, at least in election years. Perhaps of
less immediate interest to the public, disclosures about the access that lobbyists receive vis-A-vis elected officials also would help academics, think
tanks, and public interest groups conduct research studies-comparing, for
example, the relative effectiveness of campaign contributions versus lobbying in influencing elected officials or evaluating how effective campaign
contributions are in helping to secure access to elected officials- 138 which
then could be shared with society at large and used to inform future regulatory reform efforts.
Some of the reform proposals currently under consideration by Congress take a step in the right direction by advocating that lobbyists disclose
their contacts with specific elected officials. 13 9 But pending proposals do not
go far enough because they (1) require no estimation of the amount of time
(i.e., the amount of access) that a group has received to a particular official
and (2) fail to require any disclosures whatsoever by elected officials. In so
doing, pending proposals ignore the public's official-centric and accessrelated concerns about the lobbying process as well as the substantial dynamic benefits to be gained from disclosure by both officials and lobbyists
about the amount of access granted to various interests. Lobbying regulations that require disclosure of lobbyist-official contacts both from lobbyists
and from elected officials are likely to engender more accurate reporting
137.
It seems unnecessary to require disclosure of other written communications (e.g., letters) because such writings do not encapsulize the special access with which the public seems to be concerned,
but rather, constitute communications of the type that ordinary citizens themselves can and do engage in.
138.
See, e.g., de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 44, at 609-10 (speculating about such issues in the
absence of substantial empirical work); Wright, supra note 120, at 418 (similarly hypothesizing about
such issues).
139.
See Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §
104; Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong. § 104.
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from both sets of actors than are regulations that require disclosures only
from one side. This is because the ability to cross-reference lobbyists' reports of elected-official access with elected officials' own reports increases
either side's incentives to make thorough reports, lest they be accused of
underreporting based on inconsistencies between the two sets of reports.
Further, requiring disclosure by elected officials might give such officials
greater incentive to pay attention to the interest groups behind the lobbyists
with whom they are meeting, since lobbying regulations would require officials to disclose not only the names of the lobbyists they have consulted but
also the interests on whose behalf those lobbyists were acting. Elected officials, of course, have an interest in knowing who is lobbying them-indeed,
that is a significant part of the rationale behind the current disclosure-based
system of lobbying regulation° 4 0 --but to the extent that current disclosures
do not provide enough information about the real interests a lobbyist represents or that certain officials may be less than fully diligent in ascertaining
such interests,14 ' regulations requiring disclosures by officials themselves
should force officials more seriously to contemplate the source of the information provided by lobbyists. Finally, disclosure by elected officials
could be used to help level the playing field between moneyed and nonmoneyed interests. There has been some concern that the costs of filing disclosure reports may, at the margin, discourage nonprofits and other less
wealthy interests from lobbying. 42 If elected officials were required to disclose their contacts with such interests, then regulators would have some
latitude to ease reporting burdens on nonprofits and to rely on officials'
reports to provide information about nonprofits' lobbying activity-if Congress should deem this to be an equitably necessary solution.

140.
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) ("Present-day legislative complexities
are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected
representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures."); see also
sources cited supra notes 88, 89, and accompanying text.
141.
Insiders indicate that public officials meet many people without knowing whether they are
lobbyists or not, let alone what interests they represent, particularly in contexts such as receptions or
fundraisers. "The Senator is approached by someone that he does not know, who gives his or her name
and then starts to harangue the Senator about a public policy issue. The petitioner may be a lobbyist or
not. The Senator does not know." E-mail from Bill Dauster, Democratic General Counsel, U.S. Sen. Fin.
Comm. (Aug. 23, 2005, 07:54 EST) (on file with the author).
142.
See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The Court expressed concern, in the related context of election-related political activity, that
[dietailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations . . . impose administrative costs that
many small entities may be unable to bear. Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex and formalized organization than many small groups could manage.... Faced with the
need to assume a more sophisticated organizational form, to adopt specific accounting procedures, to file periodic detailed reports ....
it would not be surprising if at least some groups
decided that the contemplated political activity was simply not worth it.
Id. at 254-55; see also 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 207-13 (statement of Nan Aron, Executive
Director, Alliance for Justice) ("[W]e are nevertheless deeply concerned that the principal effect of the
bill will not be to increase the amount of information available to the public, but will be to decrease the
amount of advocacy undertaken by public interest and other citizen organizations.").
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Requiring elected officials to make disclosures about their lobbying
contacts in this fashion is not an entirely unprecedented or fanciful idea. The
importance of having disclosure statutes require information both from
elected officials and from those who seek to influence them long has been
accepted in the related context of campaign finance regulations, which require candidates to report the names of those who contribute to their political campaigns. And at least a few observers and academics had suggested,
even before the recent spate of reform proposals, that lobbying regulations
should require lobbyists to disclose the specific members of Congress or
executive branch officials whom they contact. 143 Further, the recent scandals involving Jack Abramoff and Representative DeLay prompted former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, on at least one occasion, to call for
weekly Internet disclosures of all contacts between lobbyists and elected or
appointed officials. 44 Perhaps most relevantly, an analogous disclosure
requirement already exists in the administrative context of ex parte commu145
nications between FCC decision-making personnel and interested parties.
The FCC's ex parte communication rule mandates that any party who
makes a written or oral presentation to FCC decision-making personnel or
their staff members must, by the next business day, submit copies or summaries of these presentations to the FCC Secretary for inclusion in the public record; 146 the Secretary, in turn, is required to issue a public notice at
least twice a week listing any such ex parte presentations. 147 The proposed
lobbying disclosure requirements, by comparison, would require less substantive revelations about what was discussed or presented and would do so
on a less frequent basis.
b. GrassrootsLobbying
If lobbying reforms are to help interests on either side of an issue counterbalance each other's lobbying activities effectively, then they must provide opposing interests with information about the full extent of their competitors' lobbying activities, including grassroots lobbying efforts. "Grassroots lobbying" refers to efforts by lobbyists or interest groups to contact
143.
See, e.g., Letter from John L. Zorack, President, The Prof l Lobbying & Consulting Ctr. to
Honorable John Bryant, Chairman, Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Gov't Relations of H. Comm. on the
Judiciary (Mar. 22, 1993), printed in 1993 LDA Hearing, supra note 54, at 284-85; Garrett et al., supra
note 74, at 147; 1993 LDA Hearings,supra note 54, at 303, 305 (statement of Wright H. Andrews, Jr.);
see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETr, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 313 (3d ed. 2001)

(calling the LDA's failure to require that disclosure reports reveal the names of specific legislators or
staff members with whom lobbyists have met a "significant gap").
144.
See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Go Ahead, Try to Stop K Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at 41; see
also Editorial, Newt as Diogenes in a Dark Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2006, at A10 (quoting former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich as warning Republicans that "[y]ou can't have a corrupt lobbyist
without a corrupt member or a corrupt staffer on the other end" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
145.
See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1200-.1216 (2006).
146.
Id. § 1.1206(b)(l)-(2).
147.
Id. § 1.1206(b)(4).
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constituents-either through media and mail advertising or through direct
meetings-in order to convince them of the groups' position (if they are not
already disposed to favor it) 148 and to encourage them to participate in letter
or telephone campaigns expressing their views, en masse, to elected officials. 14 9 Grassroots lobbying is a fast-growing and important lobbying tactic
in today's world;' 50 absent mandatory disclosure of this lobbying technique,
interest groups cannot obtain a complete picture of their competitors' efforts
to influence elected officials or particular policy outcomes. Indeed, disclosure of grassroots lobbying efforts may in some ways be more important
than disclosure of other lobbying activities. Because votes are the ultimate
currency in politics and officials must win reelection in order to continue in
their jobs, lobbyists' and interest groups' ability to demonstrate (or generate
the appearance of) public support for their positions may be the most critical
element in convincing elected officials to support their policy preferences. 15' Moreover, if grassroots lobbying is left unregulated by LDA reforms, it consequently will become more prevalent, as lobbyists and interest
groups gain a substantial incentive to shift their resources to this tactic in an
effort to avoid full disclosure of their lobbying activities. 52 In addition,
failure to include grassroots lobbying regulation in the LDA would exacerbate the unequal access problem by disproportionately shielding from disclosure the lobbying activities of those interest groups that have substantial
resources to spend on advertising campaigns and other means of reaching
constituents and that are well organized enough to orchestrate letter or telephone campaigns.
In terms of specifics, grassroots lobbying regulations need not require
disclosure of the names of individuals who belong to or are contacted by
particular interest group organizations or their lobbyists; the regulations
need only mandate disclosure of the fact that a group or its lobbyist has
spent $X for, e.g., "television advertisements in the State of Kansas educating residents about proposed revisions to emissions standards in the Clean
Air Act" or "grassrootslobbying, contacting residents of Denver, Colorado,
to encourage them to let their Congressmen know that they support our
position on the minimum wage." The SILEAA and LERA reform proposals
under consideration in the 109th Congress contained a well-worded disclo148.
Grassroots lobbying campaigns typically are targeted towards those who already are members of
the interest group running the campaign or who otherwise are inclined to support the group's public
policy goals. See, e.g., Ron Faucheux, The Grassroots Explosion, CAMPAIGNS & ELECrIONS, Dec./Jan.
1995, at 20, 22 (defining "grassroots lobbying" in the Grassroots Lobbying Glossary Box).
149.
See id. (describing methods of contacting legislators).
150.
See, e.g., id. at 20; Peggy Schmidt, The New Tax Bill; Legislative Mills Stir Up Lobbying, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986 (N.J. Careers Insert), at 16.
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 97, at 1723 ("[V]oters ultimately control politicians'
151.
access to representational opportunities through the vote, and money thus is useful solely in influencing
voters' choices.").
152.
Cf de Figueiredo & Garrett, supra note 44, at 623-24 (describing how political actors, in the
analogous campaign finance context, responded to each successive campaign finance reform effort by
directing their money to those avenues of spending that had been left unregulated).
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sure provision that would capture this kind of information about grassroots
lobbying communications while explicitly exempting communications from
an interest group to its own members, 53 but the latest version of the LTAA,
passed by the Senate in 2007, eliminated the grassroots disclosure requirement. 154 This is an unfortunate setback for lobbying reform that will make it
difficult for competing interests to monitor their rivals' lobbying activities.
c. Aggressive Client Disclosure
Experience in the analogous field of campaign finance and direct democracy (referenda) teaches that many interests will seek to avoid full disclosure of their lobbying activities by creating separate organizations, subsidiaries, or coalitions with unrelated names that then can be used as the
vehicles for making campaign contributions or hiring lobbyists; in this way,
only the name of the separate organization, subsidiary, or coalition-rather
than the recognizable name of the parent organization or interest group-need appear on campaign finance or lobbying disclosure forms.1 55 Such
"veiled political actors"1 56 can subvert the entire purpose of disclosure statutes by effectively shielding their lobbying activities from public view and
causing voters and competing interests to draw inaccurate conclusions about
the true nature of the groups to whom elected officials have granted political
access, and by whom such officials may have been influenced, on a particular issue. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that at least some interests
intentionally seek to mislead voters through the use of patriotic or populist
sounding names, which in some instances make them appear to represent
neutral 7 policy positions or even positions directly opposite to their true
15
ones.

153.

The section defines grassroots lobbying as:
an attempt to influence legislation or executive action through the use of mass communications directed to the general public and designed to encourage recipients to take specific action with respect to legislation or executive action, except that such term does not include any
communications by an entity directed to its members.
Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. § 106(a);
Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S.1398, 109th Cong. § 106(a). Perhaps less well worded, but
also sufficient, is the definition contained in the LTAA, which characterizes as grassroots lobbying "any
attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, to engage in lobbying contacts whether or
not those contacts were made on behalf of a client" but excepting "any attempt... by a person or entity
directed to its members, employees, officers or shareholders, unless such attempt is financed with funds
directly or indirectly received from or arranged by a retained registrant." Lobbying Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2005, S. 2128, 109th Cong. § 105(a)(2) (as introduced in Senate, Dec. 16, 2005).
154.
The amendment stripping the grassroots disclosure requirement from the LTAA was passed on
January 18, 2007, by a 55-43 vote. 153 CONG. REC. S737-43 (2007) (Senate Roll Call Vote no. 17).
155.
See Garrett & Smith, supra note 101, at 28.
156.
See id. at 2.
157.
See id. at 22, 35 (describing, for example, creation of organization with neutral-sounding name
"U.S. Term Limits" by Republican oil executives who wished to hide their party affiliation); id. at 42-43
& n.124 (describing conservative foundations' use of nonprofit organizations named the "American
Civil Rights Coalition" and "American Civil Rights Institute" to promote anti-affirmative action initiatives).
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The LDA already requires disclosure of "the name, address, and principal place of business of any organization" that "contributes more than
$10,000 toward the lobbying activities" of the registered lobbyist. 58 Some
pending reform proposals would go one step further, providing that individual members of lobbying coalitions or associations be treated as lobbyist
"clients" and mandating disclosure of such members' names. 59 These proposals are a good start, but in order effectively to combat the inevitable
veiled actor problem, lobbying reforms also should require elected officials
and lobbyists to identify the names of organizations who own more than a
threshold percentage of the named client organization or of any organization
that contributes more than $10,000 to the lobbying activities of the named
client organization. In other words, lobbying regulations should ensure the
exposure of all major entities that may be involved in a layered organizational structure underlying the named lobbying entity or lobbying client. For
the sake of consistency, the wording of such a provision can track that currently used by the LDA to ensure disclosure of any layered organizational
structures involving foreign entities and can adopt the 20% ownership
threshold employed in that section.16° All such disclosure requirements
should apply equally to nonprofit organizations that, as shown by Garrett
and Smith in the direct democracy context, otherwise are likely to be used
by corporate entities or6 1wealthy political activists to circumvent other lobbying disclosure rules.'
2. Technical Reforms
a. Quarterly Filings
If competing interests are to be expected to counterbalance each other
effectively and bring information about elected officials' lobbying contacts
to voters' attention in time for popular elections, then they must themselves
receive such information in a timely fashion. Disclosed information is, of
course, most useful if disseminated while it is current and still accurately
158.
159.
160.

2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3)(A) (2000).
See H.R. 2412, § 107; S. 1398, § 107.
See 2 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(4):
Each registration under this section shall contain-

(4) the name, address, principal place of business, amount of any contribution of more than
$10,000 to the lobbying activities of the registrant, and approximate percentage of equitable
ownership in the client (if any) of any foreign entity that(A) holds at least 20 percent equitable ownership in the client or any organization identified
under paragraph (3);
(B) directly or indirectly, in whole or in major part, plans, supervises, controls, directs, finances, or subsidizes the activities of the client or any organization identified under paragraph (3); or
(C) is an affiliate of the client or any organization identified under paragraph (3) and has a direct interest in the outcome of the lobbying activity.
Garrett & Smith, supra note 101, at 30, 35.
161.
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describes the lobbying practices of those involved; as the lag between the
lobbying activity described and the date of disclosure increases, the value of
the disclosed information becomes proportionately less and less useful. Yet,
the LDA currently requires that lobbying disclosures be made only once
every six months, by which time the information revealed will have become
quite stale. Worse, as discussed earlier, even this six-month disclosure period has been treated in an exceedingly casual manner, with 20% of lobbying disclosure forms filed more than three months late and thousands filed
more than six months late. 162 In order to ensure the usefulness of lobbying
disclosures, LDA reforms must require more frequent and more stringent
reporting deadlines. In this respect, recent reform proposals offered in the
109th and 1 10th Congresses are on the correct track, with provisions requiring that lobbying disclosures be filed on a quarterly, rather than a semiannual, basis 163 and that such disclosures be filed electronically in order to
ensure timely public access.' 64 Quarterly filings, which were the norm under
the 1946 FRLA, 165 would provide reasonably up-to-date information without overly burdening lobbyists or interest groups, while the enforcement
reforms suggested infra Part II.C.3.b should ameliorate the late filing problem.
b. Accessibility of DisclosedInformation
In order to be most useful to competing interests and the public, lobbying disclosure forms also should be easily accessible, searchable, crossreferenceable, and user-friendly. Immediate online availability of disclosure
forms, as occurs with campaign finance disclosures, is a must for widespread accessibility. Current reform proposals recognize this and accordingly require mandatory electronic filing of all lobbying reports.' 66 In addition, lobbying disclosure forms should be downloadable so that interest
groups can make use of and disseminate information from such forms
quickly and simply. Disclosure forms also should be easily searchable, by
interest group name, bill number or general issue area, elected official contacted, lobbyist name, and filing date, so that competing interests, members
of the public, the press, campaign officials, academics, and other interested
parties can discover any information they seek efficiently and accurately.
Recent reform proposals appear to address the need for such electronic manipulability, requiring that a public database of lobbying disclosure information be made available over the Internet, at no charge, "in a searchable,

162.
See sources cited supra note 67.
163.
See Legislative Transparency and Accounting Act of 2007, S. 1, 110th Cong. § 211 (2007); H.R.
2412, § 101; Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2005, S. 2128, 109th Cong. § 101 (as
introduced in Senate, Dec. 16, 2005); S.1398, § 101.
164.

S. 1, § 219; H.R. 2412, § 102; S. 2128, § 102; S. 1398, § 102.

165.
166.

See Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, tit. I, § 305, 60 Stat. 839, 840 (repealed 1995).
SeeS. 1, § 2191 H.R.2412, § 102; S. 2128, § 102; S.1398, § 102.
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sortable, and downloadable manner" that 1links
directly to information dis67
closed under certain sections of the FECA.
3. Restrictions and Penalties
a. Eliminate Restrictions on Lobbying by 501(c)(4)s
As mentioned earlier, the current LDA contains one particularly troubling provision that renders certain nonprofit organizations, as defined in
Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, ineligible to receive federal
68
awards, grants, contracts, and loans if they engage in lobbying activities.'
This provision appears to have arisen in response to the general antilobbying mood of the 1992-1995 period and the related notion that public
funds should not be used to subsidize an activity that is hated by the public
169
on behalf of organizations with whose positions not all taxpayers agree.
But the practical impact of such a provision is to create unequal access between different types of interest groups. Its effect, in essence, is to preclude
or substantially restrict the ability of certain interests-those that rely on
federal funds to operate and that have particular types of missions, as defined in the tax code-to compete in the information-providing-influenceseeking lobbying game, thus tipping the legislative balance in favor of those
interests that have more money. 70 Nonprofit organizations should not have
to muster the support of the entire citizenry-an impossible standard given
the variety of viewpoints held by citizens throughout the country on a broad
spectrum of issues-in order to be allowed to share their members' views
with elected officials or to educate elected officials on the effects of certain
policy decisions without foregoing their entitlement to federal assistance.
The LDA's restrictions on lobbying by 501(c)(4) undermine the goal of
relying on interest group competition to produce a balanced presentation of
information to elected officials and, thereby, more balanced legislating.
There cannot be balanced legislating if certain interests effectively are shut
out of the access/influence game. Thus, it is imperative that proposals for
reform of the LDA include the elimination of restrictions on 501(c)(4) organizations. Unfortunately, none of the recent lobbying reform proposals
offered in Congress has addressed this issue.

167.
See S. 1,§ 214(a)(3); H.R. 2412, § 103(a)(3); S.2128, § 103(a)(3); S. 1398, § 103(a)(3).
168.
2 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000); see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
169.
See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S10,539-40 (daily ed. July 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson, sponsor of the 501 (c)(4) provision); Lobbying By Groups Receiving FederalFunds: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 109th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Terrence Scanlon, President of the Capital Research Center),
available at 1995 WL 407997.
170.
Organizations can get around this restriction to some extent by, for example, splitting into two
qualifying Section 501 (c)(4) organizations, one of which lobbies and the other of which does not, but
this causes unnecessary administrative hassle and expenses that are likely to interfere with the organizations' ability to lobby effectively.
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Current law also limits the amount that nonprofits organized under
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code may spend on lobbying activities
without paying taxes, providing that once a qualifying organization exceeds
the limit, it will have to pay taxes on 25% of its excess lobbying expenditures. 17 ' This provision is admirably tailored to promote equitable treatment
of nonprofit versus for-profit interests. However, as LDA reforms become
effective and more information becomes available regarding the relative
lobbying expenditures and access obtained by nonprofits versus their competitors, Congress may wish to tinker with the lobbying limits or tax rate
figures currently in effect.
b. LDA Enforcement
A system of lobbying regulation that depends on transparency and on
political actors' responses to disclosed information will be only as effective
as its disclosures are accurate. As discussed earlier, meaningful enforcement
is crucial to ensuring the accuracy and usefulness of information disclosed
under the LDA. 172 The Act's current enforcement mechanisms are truly
symbolic: They provide for no investigations, audits, or other checks on the
validity of information disclosed by lobbyists and for little punishment,
even if a disclosure violation miraculously is found. In order to remedy this
situation, lobbying reforms must give substantial investigative and enforcement authority over the LDA to an executive agency that can, through
cross-referencing and other investigative techniques, identify inaccuracies
in the information reported on lobbying disclosure forms. Separation of
powers concerns dictate that this enforcement authority be located in the
executive branch, rather than left with the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate, because, inter alia,placing such authority in the hands of
agents of Congress impermissibly would encroach upon the executive
branch's constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 173 Notably, the Department of Justice has expressed concern that
even the current LDA, which expressly provides that its provisions should
not be "construed to grant general audit or investigative authority to the
Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House,"' 174 may infringe on the
executive branch's authority. 175 Moreover, giving such enforcement authority to the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate would be ineffective. The House Clerk and Senate Secretary are too close to the lobbying
process and daily congressional affairs to be entirely impartial or vigilant in
discovering and punishing lobbyists who violate the Act's disclosure re-

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
House

See 26 U.S.C. § 491 l(a)(1) (2000).
See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. n, § 3.
2 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (2000).
See Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Att'y Gen. to the Honorable Henry Hyde, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 7, 1995), printed in H. REP. No. 104-339, at 26-29 (1995).
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quirements. Indeed, some lobbyists are former members of Congress with
whom the Clerk and Secretary once may have worked closely.
The Federal Election Commission (FEC), which oversees enforcement
of campaign finance regulations, seems an ideal agency in which to situate
enforcement authority for the LDA. First, there are obvious synergies between the disclosures made under campaign finance laws and those made
under the LDA, including the fact that both statutes call for disclosure of
lobbyist contributions to candidate campaigns. The agency charged with
oversight of the LDA thus will have to engage in at least some crossreferencing with the FEC in order to check the accuracy of lobbying disclosures. Further, because lobbying and campaign contributions tend to be
complementary activities, often conducted in tandem, 76 many of the providers of lobbying disclosure information are likely to be the same entities
who provide information about campaign contributions; likewise, many of
the consumers of lobbying information-the reporters, public interest
groups, and academics who wish to track lobbying-also will be the consumers of campaign finance information. Accordingly, much of the FEC's
experience dealing in the realm of campaign finance can translate directly to
the lobbying context. Second, and related to the first, expenses and administrative hassles can be kept to a minimum if the LDA confers authority for its
enforcement in an existing agency rather than by creating a new agency,
with new offices, personnel, etc. While the FEC's budget would have to be
increased and other enhancements made to enable it to absorb the new duties associated with lobbying oversight, such enhancements would prove
less burdensome than would creating an entire new agency.
In addition, the penalties for inaccurate reporting or noncompliance
with lobbying regulations must be enhanced in order to give lobbyists and
interest groups greater incentives to be diligent and forthright in their reporting. Specifically, fines for inaccurate reporting should be changed from the
current flat sum of $50,000 to something like 20% of the lobbyist's fees or
the interest group's lobbying expenditures; this would make penalties more
equitable across lobbyists and interest groups and more painful to the bank
accounts of wealthy lobbyists and interests. Moreover, the FEC or other
oversight agency should be directed to distribute to major news outlets a list
of all lobbyists and interest groups that have been fined for making inaccurate lobbying disclosures. 177 Fear of public reprisal resulting from the revelation of such information should encourage lobbyists and interest groups to
engage in more accurate reporting. Finally, in order to ensure that the FEC's
newly conferred investigative powers have teeth and are not used in a tar176.

See Tripathi et al., supra note 98, at 151-52; Wright, supra note 120, at 418 (citing LARRY J.

SABATO, PAC POWER: INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES 124 (1984)).

177.
Something similar has been suggested in the context of federal campaign finance reform and has
been implemented on a citywide level against delinquent taxpayers. See Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence,
Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign

Finance Violationi, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 23-24, 32 & n.58 (2003).
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geted partisan manner to harass particular officials or lobbyists, lobbying
regulations could mandate random auditing of lobbyist and official disclosure reports on a periodic basis.
4. How and Where Pending Lobbying Reform ProposalsFallShort
The numerous reforms proposed by the 109th and 110th Congresses address and, in some instances even match, the proposals suggested above.
But they do not go nearly far enough in bridging the gap between the public's and Congress's concerns. Many of the proffered reforms are superficial, calling for improvements such as quarterly reporting and mandatory
online accessibility to disclosure forms without substantively addressing the
public's concerns about the access that lobbyists obtain to elected officials.
The SILEAA's and LERA's requirement that lobbyists disclose the names
of specific elected officials with whom they have met, for example, pays
only lip service to the public's concerns because it provides no information
whatsoever about the relative amount of access that different lobbyists obtain to elected officials and places no responsibility on public officials
themselves to account to the voters who elected them.
Further, despite the substantial weaknesses that have been identified in
the LDA's enforcement mechanisms, recent reform proposals offer only
minimal, symbolic enforcement reforms. The SILEAA, LTAAs, and LERA
would leave all enforcement authority as it is-in the hands of the House
and Senate clerks and with power in the U.S. Attorney's office to prosecute
offenders-but would add a requirement that the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) investigate and report to Congress semi-annually regarding
how well the House and Senate clerks are performing their duties. 78 The
SILEAA proposal then would require the House Administration Committee
and Judiciary Committee to hold hearings to consider the implications of
any recommendations made by the GAO's reports. 179 Thus, all enforcement
authority essentially would remain with the legislative branch, no entity
would be charged with investigating the accuracy of lobbying disclosures,
and no other checks or balances would exist to ensure accurate reporting.
Moreover, the SILEAA, LTAA, and LERA reform proposals offer only
minimal changes in the civil penalties applicable for violations of the Act,
increasing the potential fine for failing to file lobbying reports-not for
making inaccurate disclosures-from $50,000 to $100,000.'8° Such a penalty remains a purely symbolic one, amounting to merely a drop in the
bucket for many lobbyists and interest groups, and is likely to be far less
effective than are fines based on a percentage of lobbying income or lobby178.
See Special Interest Lobbying Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. §
401; Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2005, S. 2128, 109th Cong. § 401 (as introduced
in Senate Dec. 16, 2005); Lobbying and Ethics Reform Act of 2005, S. 1398, 109th Cong. § 401.
179.
H.R. 2412, § 403.
180.
H.R. 2412, § 402; S. 2128, § 107; S. 1398, § 108.
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ing expenditures, or the threat of media publicization of the names of entities who make inaccurate disclosures.
The most promising reform proposals are those tacked onto the 2007
LTAA by the 110th Congress, requiring disclosure of earmarks and lobbyist
fundraising activity. The earmarks proposal, unlike most of the reforms
offered in the wake of the Abramoff scandal, focuses on elected officials
rather than on lobbyists. Moreover, it has the potential to (1) improve voter
competence by making public elected officials' heretofore secret favors to
pet interests, and (2) promote more informed legislating by other Senators,
who will be made aware of their colleagues' special favors before voting to
implement them. 181 Indeed, the earmark reforms may even aid interest
groups in monitoring their competitors' lobbying successes. The chief
downside to this reform is that it binds only Senators, not other elected officials, and is limited to the narrow context of earmarks-leaving untouched
the bulk of the conduct with which lobbying regulation (and the public) is
concerned. The new provision requiring disclosure of lobbyist fundraising
activities (including bundling) likewise is a promising, though limited, step
towards increasing the information available to voters and competing interests.
Pending lobbying proposals also offer a number of less promising reforms not dictated by an interest-group-based approach to lobbying regulation, including extension of the ban on revolving-door lobbying by former
members of Congress to two or more years; 182 creation of an internal ethics
task force; 83 and stricter disclosure requirements/bans on lobbyistsponsored travel by elected officials. 184 These reforms are little more than
direct, symbolic responses to the scandal-of-the-day-lobbyist Jack
Abramoff s donation of travel expenses and other expensive gifts to numerous elected officials and their aides. While these proposals may prove useful
in inspiring Congress to ratchet up internal oversight of its own members,
reforms of this kind fail to address the public's primary underlying concern
about whom elected officials consult with when making policy decisions
and about how much access specific interest groups and lobbyists receive to
particular elected officials. Extension of the ban on lobbying by former
members of Congress, for example, sounds good but accomplishes little, as
it merely delays the onset of a practice that the public considers suspect. It
thus is a classic example of a symbolic solution that allows Congress to
appease the public superficially while continuing as usual a lobbying prac181.
Specifically, Title I, Section 103 of the 2007 LTAA would amend the Standing Rules of the
Senate to require that all Senate committee and conference reports (1) provide a list of earmarks contained therein, (2) identify the Senate member who proposed the earmark, (3) explain the earmark's
"essential government purpose," and (4) make such information available to the public on the intemet at
least 48 hours prior to its consideration in the Senate. See S. 1, §§ 103-104, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan.
18, 2007).
182.
H.R. 2412, § 201; S. 2128, § 201; S. 1398, § 201; H.R. 3623, 109th Cong. (2005) (recommend-

ing a five-year cooling-off period before allowing revolving-door lobbying).
183.
184.

H.R. 2412, § 404.
H.R. 2412, §§ 301-304; S. 2128, §§ 301-304; S. 1398, §§ 301-307.
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tice that Congress finds useful. Likewise, creation of an ethics task force
and the institution of stricter travel rules enable Congress to appear tough on
its members but will do little to change the way that lobbying is practiced or
to provide the public with more information about lobbyist interactions with
(as opposed to monetary expenditures for) members of Congress.
The one non-interest-group-based reform proposal that goes beyond
symbolism is the 2007 LTAA's ban on lobbying by spouses of elected officials. The ban, admirably, strikes at a core public concern-undue influence
exerted by lobbyists based on their special personal ties to an elected official, rather than on the value of the information or technical expertise they
provide-and does so in a way that at least does not appear open to blatant
circumvention.

It should be noted that the reforms suggested in this subpart remain centered on disclosure and thus continue the LDA's primarily symbolic approach to lobbying regulation. But while the suggested reforms will not in
and of themselves change the way that the lobbying process works, the hope
is that by taking a dynamic approach, heeding the incentives that motivate
various political actors, and requiring substantive rather than minimal disclosures, these reforms will prompt political actors to change their lobbyingrelated behavior instead of merely waiting for the public to come around, on
its own, to a more favorable view of lobbying-as preceding reforms have
done.
C. Possible Objections and Concerns Regarding the ProposedReforms
1. PracticalConcerns
The primary criticism likely to be leveled against the proposed reforms
is that they will be unduly burdensome, requiring lobbyists and elected officials to spend an excessive amount of time tracking their contacts with each
other. But while reforms requiring lobbyists and elected officials to disclose
the approximate amount of time they have spent together undoubtedly will
increase the administrative paperwork required of both entities, neither lobbyists nor elected officials will have to reinvent the wheel in order to comply with the new disclosure requirements. Many lobbyists already maintain
time logs, for client billing purposes, of their contacts with congressional
and executive branch officials on behalf of specific clients. Similarly,
elected officials and their staffs already keep calendars listing their appointments, lunches, speaking engagements, and the like with particular
lobbyists and interest groups. Such records could be used at least as a starting point for disclosure of lobbying contacts between elected officials and
lobbyists.
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Further, the disclosure requirement itself can be crafted with some sensitivity to this concern by, for example, including a de minimis provision
exempting from disclosure communications with a lobbyist that total less
than half an hour in a three month period and allowing elected officials to
approximate the amount of time spent with a lobbyist rather than requiring
strict, law-firm-style billing specificity.
A second potential problem with reforms that require greater disclosure
of lobbyist interactions with elected officials is that they might lead the already misinformed public to draw inaccurate and unfair conclusions about
lobbyists' influence. Faced, for example, with the knowledge that Congresswoman A spent twenty hours meeting with Interest Group X and that
she voted in favor of Legislation Q, which was supported by interest group
X, the public might assume that Congresswoman A voted the way she did
because of pressure from Interest Group X-although, in fact, Congresswoman A always may have supported Legislation Q and may have met with
Interest Group X in order to strategize with its members about how to get
the law enacted. 185 But while fears that the public will misinterpret disclosed information are not unrealistic, neither are they a problem that should
prove fatal to the proposed reforms. The most effective way for Congresswoman A to combat misinterpretations of this kind is to spend equal or
near-equal amounts of time meeting with Interest Group X and its competitors so that she may be in a position to explain to the public that it was not
pressure from either group, but her own convictions after considering information presented by either side, that formed the basis for her vote. As
Sunstein's polarization work suggests, reforms that inspire or force Congresswoman A to provide equal time to Interest Group X's competitors in
this manner, even if she does so purely for the sake of public appearances,
are likely to result in some tempering of Congresswoman A's views and,
accordingly, in a less extreme final version of Legislation Q.
Relatedly, the proposed reforms might be criticized on the ground that
they will produce more, rather than less, lobbying-a result that could anger
the lobbying-hating public and undermine the goal of increasing public confidence in the political process. In other words, the public may view disclosures detailing the time elected officials spend with lobbyists and interest
groups as evidence that special interests, rather than public concerns, control government policy. This, again, is a realistic danger but not one that
augurs against adopting the proposed reforms. More lobbying, as explained
above, is not necessarily a bad thing-particularly if it results in a more
balanced presentation of viewpoints and data to elected officials. Indeed,
185.

A substantial body of political science literature suggests that this kind of interaction between

lobbyists and legislators is common-that lobbying efforts do not persuade legislators but merely reinforce or encourage those who already agree with them. See, e.g., RAYMOND A. BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL & LEWIS ANTHONY DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 353 (2d ed. 1972);
DONALD R. MATIHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 191 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1973) (1960);
MILBRAT, supra note 83, at 328-31; Wright, supra note 120, at 419.
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more evenhanded lobbying by interests on either side of an issue may do a
great deal of good for the legislative process. The problem, then, is not with
lobbying per se but with the public's one-dimensional view of all lobbying
as unequivocally malevolent. The democratically correct solution cannot be
to avoid reforms that are good for the legislative process out of fear that the
public will misinterpret the consequences; rather, it should be to educate the
public about the value that lobbyists add to the political process. Specifically, elected officials, perhaps aided by public interest groups, should emphasize the informational expertise that lobbyists provide, both when campaigning for passage of reforms to the LDA and when making disclosures
thereunder. For example, when enacting LDA reforms, elected officials
should explain to the public that policymakers depend on lobbyists to educate them about the impact of certain policy proposals and that the purpose
of lobbying reforms is (1) to enable the public to see the type of help and
influence that lobbyists provide and (2) to encourage public officials to consult with and obtain information from groups on both sides of an issue.
Similarly, when making disclosures under the Act, elected officials should
be specific about the informational assistance provided by lobbyistsexplaining, for example, that they or their staff, "Met with Interest Group X
for approximately twenty hours, during which time the group's lobbyist
provided me with data including Regulation No. 5555's long-term impact
on the quality of drinking water." In this manner, disclosures revealing that
elected officials have met with interests on both sides of an issue may help
to undermine the notion that officials are controlled, rather than assisted, by
interest groups. While efforts such as these may not solve the public perception problem entirely, they 86ought at least to improve the public's views
about the lobbying process.
A third possible concern that may be raised against the proposed reforms is that they could disadvantage incumbents. After all, at election time,
voters will have information about the lobbying contacts only of those who
already have held office, leaving challengers for elective office with substantial ammunition to use against incumbents but providing incumbents
with no comparable weapon. Again, this is a realistic concern but not one
that should be considered debilitating. Many challengers for elective office
themselves will be prior officeholders, as elected officials often are career
public servants who are likely to have served in other federal positions or in
state government before seeking higher or federal office. In such cases, information about a challengers' prior lobbying and interest group contacts
also should be available in some capacity, particularly if reforms requiring
elected officials to disclose their lobbying contacts are adopted by state
governments. Even if no lobbying contact information is available for a
challenger, however, it hardly is unfair to force incumbents to defend the
186.
Of course, some of the public's perceptions about lobbying may be unalterable, but to the extent
that this is the case, there is little short of outlawing lobbying entirely that LDA reforms can do to satisfy
the public.
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choices they have made, including the people to whom they have chosen to
listen, while serving at the people's pleasure. Indeed, it is appropriate for an
incumbent's prior record to come under greater scrutiny than his challenger's because the incumbent already has been serving in the position for
which he is seeking reelection and should be held accountable to his constituents for the manner in which he has performed. In fact, to the extent
that the proposed disclosure requirements act to disadvantage incumbents,
this may even be a beneficial development that helps to balance out the incumbency advantage-name recognition, franking privilege, etc.-currently
enjoyed by those running for reelection.
Fourth, the proposed reforms might be criticized on the ground that disclosure of elected officials' lobbying contacts could generate voter backlash
against officials who associate with particular interest groups. Elected officials may worry, for example, that conservative, pro-life voters will react
negatively to the revelation that an official has met with a lobbyist representing a pro-choice group or, conversely, that liberal voters will be upset
upon learning that an official has met with a lobbyist for the NRA. In other
words, to the extent that voters themselves are polarized, they might prefer
for officials to provide limited, politically-skewed access to lobbyists and
interest groups rather than for officials to meet with groups on all sides of
an issue; further, such polarized voters might punish an official who seeks
to be more broadly inclusive. As a result, elected officials who currently
provide balanced access to groups on either side of an issue could be forced
to cease meeting with interests with whom a majority of their constituents
disagree. Such concerns about a potential backlash against particular interests are completely hypothetical at this stage, and the likelihood that the
above scenario would be played out cannot be assessed accurately at this
time. Because elected officials currently do not make any disclosures about
the access that they provide to interest groups, it is impossible to tell
whether there are officials from exceedingly conservative districts who meet
with Planned Parenthood or the ACLU or whether such officials, if they
exist, would find it necessary to cease meeting with liberal groups if the
proposed disclosure requirements were enacted. Further, it is impossible to
tell how the number of elected officials in this position compares to the
number of officials who currently meet with interests on only one side of an
issue and who would, if the proposed reforms were enacted, be driven to
provide more balanced access to interests on either side of an issue. I suspect that the number of officials in the latter category far surpasses the
number of officials in the former category because only in extremely homogenous districts can voters be expected to fall on one side of the spectrum to the exclusion of other interests; in such districts, elected officials
themselves are likely to be quite polarized and disinclined to meet with
groups whose policy preferences differ vastly from the officials' own. To
the extent that this is not the case, officials should be able to pitch their
meetings with interests on both sides of an issue as an act of simple fair
play-"I met with groups on both sides of an issue not because I agree
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wholeheartedly with either side but because I wanted to take into account
all viewpoints before making a final decision"-and to make a forceful case
to the public that the diversity of the groups with whom they have met in
fact demonstrates that political access does not equate to arm-twisting or a
pledge of ideological allegiance.
In the rare case where an official or lobbyist is reluctant to disclose access given to or received on behalf of an unpopular, perhaps ostracized,
minority group-the classic examples being the NAACP in the 1960s or the
Communist Party in the 1950s-the reforms can include a provision allowing lobbyists or elected officials to apply to the FEC for a ruling authorizing
nondisclosure of that particular interest's information, upon a showing that
the interest has been treated as a pariah group or that there is likely to be
retaliation against the interest, lobbyist, or official if lobbying contacts with
the interest are disclosed.
2. ConstitutionalConcerns
Any proposal to reform the LDA must be sensitive to the fact that lobbying is an activity protected by the First Amendment rights "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances" 187 and to freedom of speech, 188 and
that regulations which burden or chill the exercise of these rights may be
constitutionally suspect. The reforms suggested in this paper should survive
constitutional scrutiny for a number of reasons.
First, although lobbying is a protected First Amendment activity, the
protection it enjoys is not absolute. As with other First Amendment rights,
Congress may impose disclosure requirements that burden the rights of petition and speech if it can "convincingly show a substantial relation between
the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest"'189 and if the disclosure requirements are narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's interests. 90 Specifically, lobbying disclosure requirements have received the Supreme Court's express stamp of approval when
their purpose is "to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process."' 191 The disclosure requirements proposed above fit this description, as
they are designed to restore the public's faith in the "integrity of [the] governmental process" by providing information that directly addresses the
public's concerns about lobbyist access. 192 The underlying premise behind
the proposed reforms is that the public cares about lobbyists' ability to interact with and influence elected officials and that the best way to satisfy the
public and to ensure its belief in the integrity of government thus is to re187.
188.
protects
189.
190.
191.
192.

U.S. CONST. amend. .
As the Supreme Court has recognized, this right includes freedom of political expression and
the free discussion of governmental affairs. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 632 (1954).
Id. at 625.
Id.
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quire elected officials and lobbyists to disclose their contacts with each
other.
Further, Supreme Court decisions in the campaign finance context suggest that the proposed reforms would be found to intrude only minimally
upon the freedom of speech and that the specific purposes the reforms are
designed to achieve would be held to justify such intrusions. In Buckley
v. Valeo, for instance, the Court ruled that the governmental interests in (1)
providing the electorate with meaningful information about candidates and
the interests to which they are likely to be responsive and (2) deterring actual corruption and the appearance of corruption, justified campaign finance
regulations limiting individual contributions and requiring identification of
individuals who contribute to a campaign. 193 Like the campaign finance
regulations in Buckley, the disclosure requirements proposed in this Article
are designed to provide the electorate with meaningful information about
candidates-i.e., information about the relative amount of access that such
candidates have provided to particular lobbyists, on behalf of particular interest groups, in the course of making policy decisions while in office thus
far. In so doing, the proposed reforms also are meant to combat the "appearance of corruption" by demonstrating to the public that political access does
not always translate into legislative success. Moreover, the proposed reforms require only the minimum intrusion necessary to address the public's
concerns about lobbyist access-that is, disclosure of elected officials' contacts with lobbyists. They do not prohibit any type of lobbying conduct or
require disclosure of ordinary citizens' contacts with officials. In this respect, the proposed reforms are far less burdensome of First Amendment
rights than FECA's spending caps, which prohibit conduct, or FECA's recontributors be identified-both of
quirement that individual campaign
1 94
which were upheld in Buckley.
Similarly, in McConnell v. FEC,195 the Court ruled that the important
governmental interest in combating the appearance of "undue influence on
an officeholder's judgment" justified even greater restrictions on campaign
spending in the form of soft money donations. 196 The McConnell Court
noted that if it were to deny Congress the ability to regulate the appearance
of undue influence, then "the cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.' 197 This governmental concern applies equally in the lobbying
context, where the risk of "undue influence [over] an officeholder's judgment" is at least as great as it is in the campaign contribution context. 198
Indeed, influencing officials' judgment is precisely the point of lobbying
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

424 U.S. at 66-68.
Id.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
Id. at 143 (quoting FEC v. Colo.Republican Fed. Campaign, 533 U.S. 431,441 (2001)).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 143 (quoting Colo. Republican Fed Campaign, 533 U.S. at 441).
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interactions, and a failure to regulate lobbying is at least as likely as is a
failure to regulate large campaign contributions to promote the cynical assumption that well-connected interests, rather than voters, control the legislative process. The Court in McConnell implicitly acknowledged as much,
observing that the purpose of large campaign contributions, the regulation
of which it upheld, is to gain political access to elected officials. 199 Under
McConnell, it is difficult to imagine that the Court would find lobbying
regulations that require disclosures about political access qua political access to be unconstitutional.
Despite these compelling governmental interests, however, opponents
may argue that the proposed reforms violate the First Amendment because
they (1) force lobbyists and interest groups to reveal their lobbying strategies and thus might have a chilling effect on certain interest group or lobbyist behavior; (2) require disclosure of grassroots lobbying communications
with members of Congress; and (3) violate associational rights by mandating identification of the members of lobbying coalitions and major contributors to interest groups that engage in lobbying. These arguments are misguided. As Bill Eskridge has noted in testimony concerning the 1993 LDA,
any useful disclosure requirement necessarily will reveal some interest
group strategy and probably also will deter groups from making certain calculated moves. 200 But this fact does not ipso facto render the requirement
unconstitutional. Interest groups, like all citizens, have a right to petition
their government and to engage in political discussions with elected officials; they do not have a right to hide the fact that they have exercised their
rights of petition and political discussion, or the manner in which they have
exercised these rights, from the rest of the citizenry-particularly where
exposure of interest group strategy is itself likely to serve the public interest.
More specifically, the chilling effect argument against disclosure of elected
officials' lobbying contacts is unpersuasive. While an interest group understandably may prefer that its lobbying contacts remain secret, the prospect
of disclosure generally should not destroy the value of the contact or cause
the interest to abandon a particular strategy unless there was something dishonest or manipulative about the strategy in the first place. "If you're afraid
to disclose what committee or agency you're contacting, you might be up to
no good."20 ' It is not for nothing that Justice Brandeis observed that
199.
See, e.g., id. at 148 n.46, 148-50 ("[Tlhose checks open the doors to the offices of individual and
important Members of Congress and the Administration .... Labor and business leaders believe-based
on experience and with good reason-that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and affect
governmental decisions .... "); id. at 149 ('The majority of those who contribute to political parties do
so for business reasons, to gain access to influential members of Congress" (quoting McConnell v. FEC,
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 489 (D.D.C. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200.
See 1993 LDA Hearing,supra note 54, at 234, 249 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr.).
201.
Id. at 249-50. Eskridge illustrates the point with a hypothetical involving a lobbyist, acting on
behalf of Jane Doe Ministries, who makes an ex parte contact with the FCC and also contacts a staff
member of the relevant House oversight committee. Id. at 248-49. Such disclosures would reveal the
client's strategy of working the FCC from within the agency as well as through congressional pressure.
Id. at 249. Disclosure requirements that force the lobbyist to report the contacts with both the FCC and
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"[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. 2 °2 Indeed, arguing against or invalidating disclosure of
lobbying contacts on this ground would be akin to invalidating source disclosure requirements in the campaign finance context because some interests might be dissuaded from running campaign advertisements on the theory that their message would be less effective if taken in light of its source.
In fact, a similar chilling effect argument already has been rejected by the
Supreme Court in Harriss, which held that any First Amendment restraint
resulting from interest group reluctance to engage in lobbying activities for
fear of disclosure consequences "is at most an indirect one resulting from
self-censorship, comparable in many ways to the restraint resulting from
criminal libel laws. ' 20 Again, to the extent that there are legitimate retaliatory concerns that may result in the chilling of a pariah group's lobbying
activity, provision can be made allowing lobbyists and elected officials to
seek an FEC ruling excusing them from disclosing that particular interest's
information.
The argument that mandatory disclosure of grassroots lobbying violates
the First Amendment is similarly unconvincing. The reforms proposed in
this Article, and in the SILEAA and LERA, would not require disclosure of
communications from constituents-the "grassroots"-to members of Congress. Nor would they require revelation of interest groups' membership
lists or communications with their members. 20 4 The proposed reforms would
require disclosure only of communications made to the grassroots from lobbying organizations in an effort to drum up support for a particular position.
In other words, the disclosure sought in these reforms is of expenditures
made by hired guns to generate grassroots, or "astroturf, ' ,20 5 activity. There
is no constitutional right to secrecy regarding the fact that a hired lobbyist
has tried to persuade citizens of a particular viewpoint. 20 6 On the other hand,
there is a strong governmental interest in such disclosure because grassroots
lobbying is a common lobbying tactic in the modem era, whose omission
the committee may deter the lobbyist from engaging in this strategy because the FCC might then discount any phone calls that it gets from the committee, given the revelation that the committee is acting at
the lobbyist's behest rather than based on its own conviction. Id. But if this is in fact what happens,
Professor Eskridge observes, it may well be in the public's best interest. Id.
202.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
62 (1933)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203.
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
204.
Indeed, such communications explicitly are excepted from disclosure by the SILEAA. See
Special Interest Lobbying and Ethics Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2412, 109th Cong. § 107.
205.
The term "astroturf" lobbying was coined to describe lobbyist efforts to orchestrate a fake, or
less than completely accurate, showing of citizen support for a particular policy position, at the grassroots level, by advertising lobbying clients' positions to the public and encouraging individual citizens to
call or write their representatives expressing support for those positions.
206.
The analysis would be different if the party seeking secrecy was an individual citizen, expressing his or her own political views, who might be dissuaded from speaking without the benefit of anonymity. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995) (overturning conviction of a
private citizen who had circulated an unsigned leaflet opposing a local ballot measure on the ground that
state law prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutionally abridged citizens'
right of free speech but specifically disassociating this ruling from lobbying context).
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would leave the public with an incomplete picture of the lobbying process. 20 7 Further, as is the case with disclosures of lobbyists' contacts with
elected officials, if the mere prospect of disclosure deters lobbyists from
engaging in grassroots lobbying, then this suggests that the grassroots tactic
owes its effectiveness in part to misrepresentation rather than that the regulation of grassroots lobbying is unconstitutional.
Finally, while regulations requiring disclosure of major contributors to a
lobbying client and of the members of interest group coalitions do intrude
on contributors' and coalition members' First Amendment rights, such reforms should survive constitutional scrutiny so long as they are tailored to
serve the governmental interest in guarding against circumvention of disclosure requirements. In fact, in the analogous campaign finance context, the
Supreme Court specifically has recognized the validity of regulations designed to prevent the circumvention of other, first-order, regulations that
aim to combat the appearance of corruption. 20 8 The Court similarly has suggested, in the context of direct democracy referenda, that regulations requiring disclosure of the identity of the proponents of a ballot question and the
total amount of money spent for a petition campaign would be appropriately
tailored to serve the state's substantial interest in controlling special interests' domination of the initiative process.20 9 The government's interest in
preventing circumvention of lobbying disclosure laws should be considered
as strong as its interest in preventing circumvention of campaign contribution limits or silent domination of the referendum process by undisclosed
interest groups: Interest group circumvention of lobbying disclosure requirements both would give voters an incomplete picture of how particular
lobbyists and groups interact with elected officials and would skew individual interests' ability to compete effectively with their issue opponents; thus,
the government cannot achieve its interest in providing "meaningful information" to the electorate unless it is permitted to require disclosure of interest group coalition members and major financial contributors to lobbyists'
clients. 210 Further, the lobbying reforms proposed herein are narrowly tailored to serve the government's interests without unduly infringing upon
First Amendment rights, in that they would require identification of the major players behind a lobbying client while permitting de minimis contributors of less than $10,000 to remain unnamed. 1

207.
See, e.g., Faucheux, supra note 148, at 20.
208.
See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143-44 (2003) (collecting cases and noting governmental
interest in combating the appearance of corruption is sufficient to justify not only regulations imposing
limits on campaign contributions but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits by political actors).
209.
See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 202-03 (1999).
210.
211.

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
See discussion supra Part IH.B.I.c.
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IV. GETTING LDA REFORMS ENACTED
It is, of course, easy for academics to sit back, survey the scene, and
suggest grand proposals to reform ailing regulatory regimes. Far more difficult is to propose reforms that have some chance of successful implementation. This Part discusses the conditions necessary for reform of the LDA and
contemplates the political developments that would need to take place in
order for the proposed reforms to become enacted.
A. Keys to Convincing Congress
1. Lessons from the CampaignFinance Context
An important starting point for gauging the likelihood that Congress
will enact lobbying reforms requiring disclosures from elected officialsrather than merely from lobbyists-is to understand why Congress was willing, in the related campaign finance context, to enact regulations that require disclosures from candidates for elective office. Put slightly differently,
why did Congress impose disclosure requirements on public officials in the
campaign finance context but not do so in the lobbying context? The answer, I believe, is twofold. The first fold lies in differences between the
manner and frequency with which campaign finance issues, versus lobbying
process issues, are brought to the public's attention. Campaign finance issues become part of the public consciousness, on some level, at least every
two years-i.e., every time a national election takes place. The public may
pay more attention to campaign finance issues in certain election years than
in others, but candidates' fundraising efforts are a topic always in the news,
at least in the background, during an election year. Concerns about the lobbying process, by contrast, rise to the level of news only in the wake of a
scandal. Further, when scandals in either sphere grab headlines, the press
tends to frame campaign finance abuses differently than it does lobbying
abuses: Campaign finance abuses tend to be tied to the particular candidates
or political parties who solicited and received the questionable contributions, whereas lobbying abuses tend to be tied more to the interest groups or
lobbyists responsible for the questionable tactic. The Clinton Administration's infamous sale of stays in the Lincoln Bedroom, for example,
prompted criticism and outrage against the President and his staff, not
against the donors who bought themselves a date with history; by contrast,
the Keating savings and loan scandal, which involved five United States
Senators, tellingly was named after the corrupt Lincoln Savings and Loan
chairman, Charles Keating, rather than the elected officials who engaged in
questionable behavior. 1 2 The recent scandal involving Representative DeLay was unusual in lobbying history for its focus on a particular elected
Indeed, the five senators involved in the Keating scandal escaped virtually unscathed. One of
212.
them, Senator John McCain, has gone on to become a champion of ethics reform in Congress.
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official-and, not coincidentally, has prompted one of the only serious reform proposals calling for disclosure of the specific elected officials whom
lobbyists contact-but even this scandal focused at least as much on the
13
activities of lobbyist Jack Abramoff as it did on Representative DeLay.
As a result of such media and congressional portrayal, lobbying abuses generally have been viewed as the work of specific lobbyists, on behalf of specific interests, directed towards Congress as a whole, whereas campaign
finance abuses have been seen as stemming from the soliciting candidate's
campaigns. Thus, elected officials are viewed as passive acceptors of lobbyist gifts, whose transgressions lie in taking advantage of lavish perks and
allowing such gifts to influence them, while candidates campaigning for
office are viewed as responsible for, if not the architects of, questionable
contribution schemes.
The second reason for Congress's willingness to impose disclosure requirements on its own members in the campaign finance context is more
practical: The majority of actors on the other side of campaign finance contributions are individual citizens, not lobbyists. Congress would have come
under serious political fire if it had sought to place the burden of disclosure
on individual citizens rather than on candidates running for elective office.
When the entity on the other side of a campaign contribution is not a citizen
but a PAC, campaign finance regulations do require disclosure from that
entity in addition to candidate disclosure. Further, even prior to enactment
of campaign finance laws, candidates' reelection committees kept track of
contributions made to candidates' campaigns; thus, candidate-side disclosure of campaign finance contributions did not require reinventing the
wheel but could instead build upon existing internal records.
In sum, differences in public perception and presentation, combined
with practical recordkeeping considerations, left Congress with no choice
but to put candidates for elective office at the forefront of campaign finance
disclosure rules; whereas in the lobbying context, legislators were free to
place the entire burden of disclosure on lobbyists alone.
2. Engendering Public Support
Not surprisingly, then, one key ingredient for successful reform of the
LDA is public perception and public support for specific reforms. In order
for elected officials to be persuaded to enact specific reforms-e.g., disclo213.
See, e.g., Les Blumenthal, Group Wants Hastings Off Panel, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.), June 10, 2005, at B02 (describing Abramoff as "the lobbyist at the center of DeLay's problems"); Philip Shenon, Lobbying Probe Spurs Request, ALBANY TIMES UNION, July 6, 2005, at A7
(discussing expansion of congressional investigation into wrongdoing by Abramoff, who worked closely
with DeLay and paid for DeLay's airfare on a trip to England and Scotland as well as for an expensive
skybox used by DeLay to entertain donors); House Breakthrough Could Lead to DeLay Probe,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 1, 2005, at 5D (noting that news organizations had uncovered documents
showing connections between payments to DeLay and lobbyist Jack Abramoff); Coushatta Tribe Was
Told to Reroute DeLay Money, FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, June 22, 2005, at A6 (discussing failure
by DeLay political groups to disclose checks from Indian tribe connected to lobbyist Jack Abramoff).
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sure of lobbyist contacts with specific officials, disclosure by officials, disclosure of grassroots lobbying, stronger penalties and enforcement mechanisms-the public first must agitate against failures in the current lobbying
regulation system that correspond to these reforms. Instead of vague dissatisfaction with lobbyists and criticism of the influence that interest groups
exert over elected officials, the public would need to express concern or
even ire about grassroots lobbying, inadequate oversight of compliance with
lobbying disclosure rules, and the fact that lobbying regulations fail to require any information about lobbyist access to elected officials, let alone
any disclosures by elected officials themselves.
Experience teaches that such specific public pressure is likely to occur
only if one of two developments takes place: (1) the public receives news of
a large scandal involving grassroots lobbying, or particular officials' contacts with lobbyists, or widespread noncompliance with lobbying regulations; or (2) political elites-whether candidates for elective office, party
heads, or heads of public interest organizations such as Ralph Naderorchestrate a national campaign highlighting deficiencies in the current
LDA and calling for reforms akin to those proposed in this Article. The
power of a public scandal to prompt reforms tailored (sometimes myopically) to prevent recurrences of similar scandals in the future is historically
obvious and needs little exposition. The power of political elites to shape
public opinion is perhaps less well understood, except by political scientists.
In brief, some political scientists have posited that public opinions overwhelmingly are developed through heuristic cue-taking from political elites.2 14 The public pays little attention to political facts on its own; it becomes interested only when political actors, often in political speeches,
make such facts symbolically threatening or reassuring-and even then the
public responds to the cues from the political elites' speeches, not to direct
knowledge of the facts.21 5 Thus, efforts by political candidates, parties, or
prominent political figures (e.g., Ralph Nader or Ross Perot) to connect
public dissatisfaction with the lobbying process to a particular cause and to
generate public support for specific reforms aimed at eradicating that
cause-i.e., to make lobbying facts symbolically meaningful-could be the
key to successful LDA reform. This is precisely what happened in 1992
when presidential candidate Ross Perot made revolving-door lobbying a
campaign issue 2 16 and roused public sentiment to such an extent that mainstream candidate Bill Clinton also took on the cause and, upon winning the
214.
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 106, at 1162 (citing JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF
MASS OPINION 40-52 (1992)).
215.
See EDELMAN, supra note 13, at 172.
216.
See, e.g., Adam J. Rombel, Interest Group Politics in the Northeastern States, SPECTRUM: J.
STATE GOV'T, Sept. 22, 1994, at 46 (book review) (observing that "Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign focused attention on the problem of lobbyists" by, inter alia, specifically criticizing the revolvingdoor practice of government officials turning into lobbyists upon leaving government); Jane Bussey,
U.S. Officials Who Quit To Lobby For Mexico Are Brought Under Fire, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 11, 1992,
at 3K (describing Perot campaign commercial criticizing former government officials who walked
through the "revolving door" to become lobbyists after leaving office).
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election, issued an executive
order restricting revolving-door lobbying by
2 17
executive branch officials.
The first condition for reform, public scandal, undoubtedly was satisfied
during the summer and fall of 2005 by revelations of Representative Tom
DeLay's ethics violations involving lobbyist-paid travel and other gifts.
Predictably, this scandal inspired several reform proposals, including the
SILEAA and LERA, which took the unusual step of calling for disclosures
of lobbyist contacts with specific public officials. But the second condition,
support from political elites, also must exist if lobbying reform is to make it
past the proposal stage and become law. Indeed, history teaches that championing by political elites plays a more important role than the existence of
a public scandal in effecting successful lobbying reform: Despite numerous
previous attempts at reform in the wake of lobbying scandals, Congress
ultimately enacted the FRLA and the LDA, not in response to a public
scandal, but as the result of internal pressure to reorganize the way Congress
operated (1946)218 and public pressure, generated by political elites, to
"change the way business is done in Washington" (1992 and 1994),219 respectively.
It is, at this point, unclear whether the requisite support from political
elites will emerge. Various Senators and Representatives started the ball
rolling, but then abandoned it, allowing political in-fighting to delay passage of, and even strip key provisions (e.g., grassroots lobbying) from, their
proposed reforms. Speaker Nancy Pelosi seems to have made lobbying reform a priority in the 110th Congress, and Senators McConnell and Reid
have put the issue back on the table with some meaningful proposals in the
2007 LTAA. But it still is unclear whether these reforms ultimately will
stick, and more championing from elites will be necessary if the reforms
suggested in this Article are to succeed. The Democratic Party (insofar as it
seeks to keep the DeLay scandal fresh in the public's mind) or public interest groups could be ideal candidates for pushing forth the reforms suggested
in this Article, particularly those relating to stronger penalties and transfer
of enforcement authority to the FEC. Given legislators' self-interested behavior, however, it is unlikely that any current member of Congress will
take up the mantle in favor of disclosure by elected officials; thus, this reform likely would have to be brought to the fore by an outsider, akin to a
Ross Perot in 1992, in order to succeed. Newt Gingrich may perhaps be able
to fulfill this role, if he is so inclined, given his name recognition and his
217.

See, e.g., David Com, Beltway Bandits: Reversing the Reagan/Bush Years, THE NATION, Nov.

23, 1992, at 620 (reporting that during the campaign Clinton, "stealing Ross Perot's tune," had "decried
the revolving door through which government officials pass into positions as lobbyists" and was now
making good on this promise by instituting an executive order forcing executive appointees to pledge not
to lobby their agencies for five years after leaving their government posts).
218.
The FRLA was enacted as a last-minute add-on to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
and was "in effect carried through on the coattails of the other Congressional reforms regarded as more
important by Congress." See Kennedy, supranote 88, at 548.
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See sources cited supra note 18 and accompanying text.

2007]

Interest-Group-Based Approach to Lobbying Regulation

571

penchant for no-nonsense comments such as, "You can't have a corrupt
lobbyist without a corrupt member or a corrupt staffer on the other end. 220
3. PoliticalReality
Because of legislator self-interest, Congress is certain to be reluctant to
enact regulations that require its own members and staff to disclose their
lobbying contacts. Further, it is unlikely to be pleased at the prospect of a
system that encourages additional interests to approach its members seeking
face time equal or proportionate to that received by their competitors. But if
outside-the-beltway political elites akin to Ross Perot or Ralph Nader are
willing and able to focus the public's attention on the inequity and inadequacy of forcing lobbyists, but not elected officials, to make disclosures
about their lobbying interactions, Congress nevertheless could find itself
forced into imposing lobbying disclosure requirements on itself and other
elected officials. Absent efforts by political elites to generate such public
clamoring for elected official disclosures, the closest, second-best solution
that we may see is enactment of regulations requiring lobbyists to list the
specific public officials with whom they meet, perhaps along with some
estimate of the amount of time spent with those officials. As discussed supra Part lI.B.l.a, such a disclosure requirement would not provide all of
the benefits of disclosures by elected officials, but it would improve competing interests' ability to monitor and match each others' efforts and thus
would be a step in the right direction.
B. Interest Group Support
Madisonian ideals aside, the political reality is that we live in a Mancur
Olson 221 world where wealthy, powerful, organized interests tend to exert
disproportionate influence over the legislative process. While Congress has
proved capable of enacting lobbying reforms without the support of organ22
ized interests,2
the reforms proposed in this Article, particularly those calling for disclosure of lobbyist contacts with specific elected officials on behalf of specific interests, would face an exceedingly uphill battle if opposed
by those interests that currently hold the most power and access to legislators. Thus, interest group reaction is an important factor to consider in
220.
Editorial, supra note 144 (quoting former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich) (internal quotation marks omitted).
221.
Olson was a public choice theorist who famously argued that small interest groups with intensely held preferences, not necessarily in the public or majority interest, are the most likely to organize
and, therefore, to wield disproportionate influence over legislative policy. See generally MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).

222.
In 1993, for example, Congress successfully eliminated tax deductibility of lobbying expenses
despite lobbyist and interest group opposition, but this was an unusual case, in which elected officials
and the public overwhelmingly supported the reform. See, e.g., Joel Brinkley, Lobbyists Appear Inept
When They're the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1993, at A12; Michael Wines, Lobbyists Scrambling to
Kill A Clause That's About Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at Al.
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evaluating the likelihood that the reforms proposed herein might successfully be enacted. For the reasons outlined below, I believe that interest
groups should be inclined to support the proposed reforms.
First, special interests, and particularly those "Mancur-Olson" interests
that are best organized and currently receive the most access to elected officials, may gain from having an official system that tracks access to lawmakers. As discussed earlier, such a system would help organized interests legitimate their claims to group members that they have been successful in
making their case to elected officials and in achieving desired group objectives.223
Second, it is likely that competing interests, like competitors in any
business industry, always will want more rather than less information about
their competitors, even if it means having to give up information about
themselves. Indeed, in the economic marketplace, we have antitrust laws
designed to restrict the sharing of competitive information precisely because
we fear that if businesses have such information, they may collude or allocate their resources in all-too-effective ways. In the political marketplace,
powerful, wealthy interest groups have similar incentives. Such groups tend
to have wide lobbying interests and may obtain substantial congressional
deference in some contexts but very little in others. As a result, they may be
willing to tolerate more transparency for their lobbying activities in sectors
where they are winning in exchange for more transparency regarding their
lobbying activities in sectors where they are losing. To be sure, this would
cause such interests to lose some effectiveness in areas where they currently
are the only side being represented, but it also would enable them to gain
effectiveness in other areas where they are underrepresented; this is a tradeoff that at least some, if not most, interests may be willing to make. It is
only interests who constantly are winning all of their battles who might oppose reforms aimed at increasing transparency, and even such interests may
believe that the time lag between their lobbying activities and disclosure
thereof will be sufficient that they need not worry about reforms requiring
greater disclosure.
Third, greater transparency may assist interests with coalition-building
by revealing additional groups with like interests or groups who have demonstrated access to a key influential legislator or committee. The magnitude
of this benefit may be limited to the extent that groups in an industry already are familiar with each other, but the proposed disclosures may at least
help at the margins. Fourth, interest groups should support the proposal that
contacts between lobbyists and specific elected officials be disclosed because such disclosures will save interests some of the time and energy currently spent "monitoring, tracking, and assessing the activities of govem-

223.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
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ment officials" and will provide more accurate and thorough information
about these activities. 224
Even the proposal requiring disclosure of grassroots lobbying activities
should not garner the interest group opposition that it did in 1995, so long as
it exempts from disclosure communications between interest groups and
their own members and otherwise protects membership lists from exposure.
A grassroots disclosure requirement along the lines of that proposed in the
SILEAA and the LERA should satisfy such First Amendment concerns
while still providing the information needed by competing interests.
CONCLUSION
Interest group attempts to match each other's efforts always will be a
guessing game: Lobbying disclosures of necessity will be retrospective and
thus will not enable interests to discover their opponents' current lobbying
practices, but only will reveal the access that a group has obtained in the last
reporting period. Moreover, interest groups always will be one step ahead of
lobbying reforms and regulations, seeking new ways to avoid disclosing
certain information. The hydraulics principle that as one hole is plugged
another will open certainly applies here. As a result, lobbying reforms may
produce their own share of unintended consequences; we may, for example,
next see an increase in elected officials lobbying each other-i.e., members
of Congress lobbying executive agencies, executive officials lobbying Congress--or a shift to lobbying of political parties rather than individual
elected officials in an effort to circumvent disclosure requirements. Thus,
lobbying reforms should be enacted with the expectation that they will need
to be reevaluated and revised in the not-too-distant future.
In recognition of this reality, the reforms proposed in this Article are not
offered as a panacea, or even as a permanent partial fix, for all that ails the
lobbying process. Rather, they are intended as a step towards dynamic regulation of the lobbying process, in a manner that realistically accounts for and
utilizes different political actors' internal incentives to inspire more balanced legislating and, ideally, enhanced voter competence.

224.
See Robert H. Salisbury, Putting Interests Back Into Interest Groups, in INTEREST GROUP
POLITICS, supra note 29, at 371, 382.

